NEW YORK TIMES
15 AUG 1972

Harper & Row announces publication of "THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA"



HARPER & ROW is publishing this week a brilliant and controversial study of the international narcotics traffic and the role played in it by agencies of the U.S. Government, including the CIA. The book is THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. The principal author is Alfred W. McCoy,* a twenty-seven year old graduate student in history at Yale University.

In early June 1972 Mr. McCoy testified on the general subject matter of his book before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee (better known as the Proxmire Committee). Shortly thereafter, the CIA asked Harper & Row for an opportunity to read Mr. McCoy's manuscript prior to publication. The CIA stated that:

"In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U.S. Government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence. It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the supporting evidence was valid.*** We believe we could demonstrate to you that a considerable number of Mr. McCoy's claims about this Agency's alleged involvement are totally false and without foundation, a number are distorted beyond recognition, and none is based on convincing evidence."

*with Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II

continued

STATINTL [redacted]

POWER [redacted]

OF THE

STATINTL

PENTAGON



the creation,
control and acceptance
of defense policy by the

U.S. CONGRESS

MEMPHIS, TENN.
WORLD
JUN 10 1972
WEEKLY - 8,000

INSIGHT

HAL SUIT

The illegal release of the Pentagon Papers and the more recent use of secret documents by columnist Jack Anderson has re-opened the problem of what should and should not be classified.

During a conversation a few years ago with the late Senator Richard Russell I asked why the CIA reports on Lee Harvey Oswald's travels in Mexico had to remain classified as secret and why they had to stay secret for many years to come.

The senator was at that time, and had been for more than a decade, chairman of a special appropriations subcommittee which controlled all CIA funds. There wasn't anyone who was in a better position to answer the question than Russell.

He gave me a plausible reason for the secrecy. The senator noted, and it's true, that we have people in every country in the world who are friendly to the U.S. and though not citizens of this country they often supply our intelligence people with information. Some are businessmen, some fishermen, artists, students and so forth. They are basically loyal to their own country, but still willing to help us. The CIA report on Oswald's travels in Mexico contains not only the facts about his movements in that country but the names of the individuals who provided those facts. If the report was made public at this time some of the contacts would end up facing a firing squad and if they weren't shot or imprisoned they would no longer be of any value as contacts. Their future services would be nil. Since they are still needed it makes good sense to keep their identity unknown.

But what about thirty years from now? This is the time frame being recommended by the National Security Council as a reasonable time to keep papers secret yet there are opponents around who want the lid to stay on far beyond three decades.

That's pretty hard to buy even from the individuals who claim diplomatic or military secret codes can be endangered by releasing thirty year old data. It seems illogical to assume that codes aren't changed in more than thirty years and even more illogical to believe any nation can keep a code unbroken for thirty years. If this is happening it is a first for all time. A recent rash of non-fiction books have pretty well dispelled the idea that unbreakable codes exist. If a man or woman can conceive them sooner or later another man or woman will be able to unravel them.

Anyone who reads my columns very long knows I am pro-military, but I've long been aware of the military's inclination to mark anything and everything secret and keep that tag on forever. In some cases this practice can be defended, but not for 50 or 100 years. While true military secrets should be carefully guarded military blunders should not. Time doesn't erase stupidity, but it hides it and that's wrong.

During World War II many a bulletin board was so plastered with memos that it was a standard joke that if one dug deep enough he'd find a KP order from Valley Forge still tacked up. If one could actually dig deep enough in Pentagon records there's a chance that some of George Washington's actual orders are still stamped secret. In a free society that's no joke.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
17 MAY 1972

[redacted]

The White House Classifies, and Congress Ossifies

BY TRB

WASHINGTON—Secrecy leads to self-deception. If you want proof of that overlooked political axiom, look at the way we have gotten involved with a secret mercenary army in Laos.

It all started not so innocently a decade ago, when the Central Intelligence Agency recruited, directed and supported an army of Meo tribesmen to keep Laos from going Communist. It was like having a Gurkha army of our own, only no one knew we had it and thus nobody cared that we were getting ever more involved in a war in Laos. It was all going splendidly until the CIA sent Gen. Vang Pao and his army on an ill-fated offensive last spring. The Meo "irregulars" got chewed up; they had about 10% casualties. That might not have been too bad except there were no more tribesmen to recruit in Laos. So the CIA started recruiting mercenaries in Thailand, only it called them "volunteers."

Now the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has discovered that we have a $100 million annual commitment to finance an army of 10,000 Thai "volunteers" fighting in Laos. The Thais like it because they are getting good pay as well as extra military assistance from the United States. Presumably the Laotians like it because the Meo and Thai can do the fighting. But what about Congress and the poor American taxpayer who never knew they were running up a $100 million annual bill in Laos? And what about the present moral character of a nation that 200 years ago won its independence fighting Hessian mercenaries?

Put aside all the moral, geopolitical and financial considerations. It's also a disturbing case of the evils of secrecy in our government and Congress. Secrecy provides a way to subvert the constitutional checks and balances on the war powers.

Oh sure, the CIA informed a few members of the Appropriations Committee. But then it intimidated them by explaining it was so hush-hush they couldn't talk about it to the rest of Congress. After that the privileged few didn't even bother to raise questions—that was until Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) and his foreign relations subcommittee started poking around in the secret war in Laos. Even now the State Department and CIA won't 'fess up to what they are doing with the Thai mercenaries. The reason is that Congress last year passed a law prohibiting the use of defense funds to help third-country forces fight in support of the Laotian or Cambodian governments. If all the facts were made public, it would be evident that the executive branch was violating the law.

It's easy enough to blame the executive branch for its secrecy. Everybody knows — including President Nixon, who issued a new executive order on classification recently —that the government business is weighted down with excessive secrecy.

For all its criticism of the executive branch, Congress really likes secrecy. At least those in power do because secrecy means power. "If you only knew what I knew" makes a senator very important in his own eyes and in the eyes of his colleagues.

If you want a bewildering example, take the case of Symington. One day he is deploring the executive branch's secrecy on the Thai mercenaries. The next day he is on the Senate floor questioning whether secrets should be given to members of Congress except those on the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Atomic Energy committees. Symington, it should be pointed out, is the only member of all three committees.

Or take the case of Rep. Bella Abzug, who had the temerity to introduce a resolution demanding information on how many bombs we are dropping in Indochina. From the horrified look on the face of Rep. F. Edward Hebert, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, you would have thought Ms. Abzug wanted to reveal the secrets of the A-bomb. But really his consternation was over the fact that she was challenging the power of the Armed Services Committee, which wants to keep such information locked up in its own safes.

Maybe Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska), with his maverick ways, is finally forcing Congress to face up to the problem. He tried the other day to place in the Congressional Record a copy of a still secret national security memorandum that Henry Kissinger had prepared back in 1969 on the Vietnam options open to the Nixon Administration. It was enough to send the Senate sputtering into two days of secret sessions. The basic objection was that Gravel would be violating the law by making public a document classified secret. Then to the amazement of the senators, it turned out that there was no law specifically authorizing the executive branch to classify information. The whole secrecy system, it turns out, just rests on implied powers assumed by the executive branch.

The whole security system obviously is not going to come tumbling down. Nor should it. But once Congress starts questioning it, maybe it will begin to realize that Gravel has a point when he argues that Congress also can determine what information should be made public. Right now it's reached the point of absurdity: the Senate sends its debates in secret session down to the executive branch to be declassified.

Congress ought to understand that it need not be such a willing, acquiescent partner in a secrecy system that leads not only to deception but to the impotence of Congress.

[redacted]

STATINTL

BALTIMORE SUN

TRB

13 MAY 1972

[redacted]

Mercenary use in Laos shows evils of secrecy

Washington.

Secrecy leads to self-deception. If you want proof of that overlooked political axiom, then look at the way we have gotten involved with a secret mercenary army in Laos.

It all started off not so innocently a decade ago when the Central Intelligence Agency recruited, directed and supported an army of Meo tribesmen to keep Laos from going Communist. It was like having a Gurkha army of our own, only no one knew we had it and thus nobody cared that we were getting ever more involved in a war in Laos.

It was all going along splendidly until the CIA sent General Vang Pao and his army off on an ill-fated offensive last spring. The Meo "irregulars" got chewed up; they had about 10 per cent casualties. That might not have been too bad except there were no more tribesmen to recruit in Laos. So the CIA started recruiting mercenaries in Thailand, only it called them "volunteers." Now the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has discovered that we have a $100 million annual commitment to finance an army of 10,000 Thai "volunteers" fighting in Laos.

The Thai like it because they are getting good pay as well as extra military assistance from the United States. Presumably the Lao like it because the Meo and Thai can do the fighting. But what about the Congress and the poor American taxpayer who never knew they were running up a $100 million annual bill in Laos? And what does it say about the present moral character of a nation that 200 years ago won its independence fighting Hessian mercenaries?

Put aside all the moral, geopolitical and financial considerations. It's also a disturbing case of the evils of secrecy in our government and Congress. Secrecy provides a way to subvert the constitutional checks and balances of the war powers.

Oh sure, the CIA informed a few members of the Appropriations Committee. But then it intimidated them by explaining it was so hush-hush they couldn't talk about it to the rest of Congress. After that the privileged few didn't even bother to raise questions—that was until Senator Stuart Symington and his Foreign Relations subcommittee came along and started poking around in the secret war in Laos. Even now the State Department and CIA won't 'fess up to what they are doing with the Thai mercenaries. The reason is that Congress last year passed a law prohibiting the use of defense funds to help third-country forces fight in support of the Laotian or Cambodian governments. If all the facts were made public, it would be evident that the executive branch was violating the law.

It's easy enough to blame the executive branch for its secrecy. Everybody knows—including President Nixon, who issued a new executive order on classification recently—that the government business is weighted down with excessive secrecy. There's probably no cure unless bureaucrats are punished for over-classification, and nobody is about to do that. But much of the blame must be placed on Congress for the way it has tolerated secrecy even within its own ranks.

For all its criticism of the executive branch, Congress really likes secrecy. At least those in power do because secrecy means power. "If you only knew what I know" makes a senator very important in his own eyes and in the eyes of his colleagues. It also is a very good argument to silence any upstart who dares question the wisdom of the Appropriations Committee or the Armed Services Committee.

If you want a bewildering example, take the case of Senator Symington. One day he is issuing a statement deploring the executive branch's secrecy on the Thai mercenaries. The next day he is on the Senate floor questioning whether secrets should be given to members of Congress except those on the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Atomic Energy committees. Senator Symington, it should be pointed out, is the only member of all three committees.

Secrecy is also a convenient way for Congress to avoid responsibility it really doesn't like. "Only the President has access to all the secret information and he must know what is right." That's a common refrain around Capitol Hill these days when the President is getting us deeper into the Vietnam war. It's also an easy way to hide behind the President and duck responsibility.

The whole security system obviously is not going to come tumbling down. Nor should it. But once Congress starts questioning it, maybe it will begin to realize that Senator Mike Gravel has a point when he argues that Congress also can determine what information should be made public. Right now it's reached the point of absurdity; the Senate sends its debates in secret session down to the executive branch to be declassified.

Congress ought to understand that it need not be such a willing, acquiescent partner in a secrecy system that leads not only to deception but to the impotence of Congress.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 APR 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

Congress and C.I.A.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings last week on a bill requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to provide the appropriate Congressional committees with the same intelligence analyses it regularly furnishes the White House. This legislation, introduced last year by Senator Cooper, ought to be expedited in the interests of strengthening the machinery of foreign policy.

As Congress reasserts its rightful role in the foreign policy process, it is essential that its members be as fully informed as possible. The respective Congressional committees are entitled to share the fruits of intelligence-gathering operations for which the American taxpayer is billed up to $6 billion annually. These fruits include assessments which sometimes sharply challenge Executive policies, as the Pentagon Papers revealed.

There is ample precedent for Senator Cooper's proposal. A former C.I.A. official testified last week that the agency has been furnishing highly classified intelligence on world atomic developments to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee for fifteen years, with no security breaches. Even now, senior agency officials provide oral briefings to other committees on request but only with White House approval. Congress could better discharge its own constitutional responsibilities in the foreign policy field if it had full and direct access to this information.

Beyond the Cooper bill, it is high time Congress revived its languishing effort to establish closer scrutiny of intelligence operations. In a move designed to sidetrack legislation with this aim, the Foreign Relations Committee in 1967 was invited to send three members to the C.I.A. joint briefings held by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, which are currently responsible for overseeing intelligence activities. But no meetings of this group were called during all of last year—an "oversight" of frightening dimensions.

It is not enough for Congress to know what the C.I.A. is saying. It is also essential that at least key members of the legislative branch, which provides the funds for worldwide intelligence-gathering and other undercover operations, keep informed about what, in general, this secret arm of the United States Government is doing.

CHICAGO SUN-TIMES
28 MARCH 1972

STATINTL [redacted]

McCone backs bill to give Congress CIA reports

STATINTL [redacted]

By Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — John A. McCone, a former Central Intelligence Agency director, has endorsed a bill that would require the CIA to turn over its secret intelligence reports to Congress.

His endorsement indicates that the CIA has abandoned its long-standing opposition to the circulation of its secrets outside the executive branch.

Aides to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported Monday that McCone had committed himself to testifying in favor of the bill during hearings starting Tuesday. The aides said the Nixon administration had registered its opposition to the bill, thereby preventing the current CIA director, Richard M. Helms, a presidential appointee, from taking a position on it.

Indirect support

But McCone's testimony is sure to be interpreted as indirect CIA support of the bill. Former directors of the agency, a loyal and tightly knit group, rarely, if ever, take a public position that the incumbent director opposes.

The bill was introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) last July, shortly after the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Sun-Times and other newspapers published the Pentagon papers. The papers revealed that the CIA consistently expressed a skeptical view of Vietnam from the Truman to the Nixon administrations. Cooper and other senators argued that Congress might have blocked the deep U.S. involvement if it had received the intelligence estimates.

Regular reports

Cooper's bill would require the CIA to make regular reports to the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee. It also would require the CIA to provide special information on request.

Tuesday's witnesses will be Chester Cooper, former intelligence analyst for the CIA and the White House, and Herbert Scoville, former head of the CIA's research division.

Sec. of State William P. Rogers, who has asserted the right to testify for the CIA, has been asked to appear after the Easter recess to present the administration's position. He may send a subordinate but presumably not Ray Cline, head of the department's bureau of intelligence and research.

An ITT director

Cline, a former deputy CIA director for intelligence, recently told the committee that he favored the distribution of CIA reports to Congress, provided the "sources and methods of intelligence gathering" were not jeopardized. Cooper insists that his bill provides adequate protection.

McCone is scheduled to testify next month. It may be the first in a series of appearances before the committee. As a director of the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., he is a potential witness in the committee's planned investigation of the involvement of major corporations in U.S. foreign policy.

According to memos released by columnist Jack Anderson, McCone was given reports on ITT negotiations with the CIA to devise a plan for blocking the installation of Salvador Allende, a Marxist, as President of Chile in 1970.

WASHINGTON POST
26 MAR 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

Discord Surrounds Roles Of Hill Units on Defense

By Jack McWethy
Congressional Quarterly

Advocates of Pentagon policy or overseers of the military? There is sharp disagreement over which role the House and Senate Armed Services committees play.

These facts emerge from a Congressional Quarterly study:

• On both committees, about two-thirds of the members come from states or districts whose No. 1 source of federal money is the Pentagon.

• In the 11 years that the committees have been authorizing money for weapons, 65 per cent of the big money bills were passed on the floor without amendment to the dollar total.

• Not once in the same 11 years was an amendment to alter dollar totals of House committee bills adopted over objections by the committee chairman. It's happened only three times in the Senate.

• Both committees consistently cut the Pentagon's budget request, but one member of Congress who used to be a budget planner in the Pentagon said the requests are routinely padded in anticipation of the cuts.

Making America's defenses strong against the Soviet threat is like a horse race to F. Edward Hebert, the crusty Louisiana Democrat who heads the House Armed Services Committee.

"In war they don't pay off for second place. There's one bet and you've got to have the winner," Hebert says.

"I intend to build the strongest military we can get," he adds. "Money's no question."

Hebert's attitude exasperates a five-man minority on the 39-member committee, but they are helpless against the chairman's overwhelming support in committee and on the floor.

"The House Armed Services Committee doesn't control the Pentagon," says Rep. Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.), one of the dissenting five. "The Pentagon controls the House Armed Services Committee."

REP. F. EDWARD HEBERT
. . . money's no object

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), a committee member who was an economic adviser to former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, says: "We used to think of the House Armed Services Committee as the one we could count on to carry water for us."

Hebert dismisses these charges as ridiculous. "Yes, I'm a friend of the military, he says, "but I'll take them to the woodshed and spank them any time."

Though the dissidents give Hebert high marks for fairness, his power is an irritant to those who feel the committee is not tough enough on the Pentagon's budget request.

"If the Armed Services Committee isn't looking out for the taxpayer, then who the hell is?" Aspin asks. "Nobody on the floor of the House is going to be able to push through an amendment to an Armed Services Committee bill, and God knows, we've tried."

Last year, for example, 21 amendments were offered to the $21.3 billion weapons authorization bill and only two were accepted by the House. Hebert offered one of the adopted amendments and supported the other.

"That's right," smiles Hebert. "The power is awesome."

In the Senate, John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) and his predecessors as committee chairman once enjoyed the same kind of unwavering majority support. But the scene has changed in the last four years.

Former Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington, next to Stennis the ranking Democrat on the Senate committee, says: "More than ever before in the years that I've been around here, people — liberals and conservatives—are apprehensive about the future viability of the economy and the soundness of the currency." This kind of apprehension, the Missourian says, is having a direct effect on the way the committee and the Senate in general look at the defense budget.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

Congress Cuts Secret Panel Meetings by 5%

1971 Record Shows 36% of Sessions Are Closed-Door in Year Reform Act Is Passed

Exclusive to The Times from the Congressional Quarterly

WASHINGTON — Congressional committees met in secret slightly over one-third of the time last year.

Congressional Quarterly's annual tabulation of committee sessions showed 36% were held behind closed doors in 1971, the year a new law—aimed at opening meetings to the public—went into effect.

This marked a decrease from the 41% closed committee sessions recorded in 1970, but matched the secrecy score for 1969.

Since 1953, when Congressional Quarterly began its annual tally of open and closed committee meetings, 23,720—or 37%—of the 64,231 meetings reported have been held in executive (closed) session.

The highest secrecy score was 43% in 1968. The record low was 30% in 1959.

The House, as usual, topped the Senate in the number of executive sessions. The public was barred from 41%—1,131 of 2,785—of its committee sessions. This was a decrease from the 48% of 1970 but comparable to the 42% recorded in 1969.

Senate at 30%

Senate committees had a secrecy score of 30%—down from the 33% of 1970 but up from the 28% in 1969. It closed 580 of 1,905 meetings.

Few executive sessions were held by joint congressional committees. Of 126 joint committee meetings reported, only 20, or 16%, were closed.

Most noteworthy in 1971 was the opening of selected House Appropriations Committee hearings.

Although only 8% of its [illegible] were open, this was in contrast to the 0% recorded in the past.

The 1970 reform act stipulated that House Appropriations budget hearings are to be held in open session, except when testimony may affect national security.

Ways and Means was the only other House committee to meet more than 100 times and close its doors more often than not. It closed 69 of 111 sessions for a secrecy score of 62%.

On the Senate side, only one committee which met more than 100 times held the majority of meetings in executive session. The Armed Services Committee closed 118 of 150 meetings.

50% Record

The Senate Public Works Committee barred outsiders from 50% of its sessions.

The House Education and Labor Committee remained at the top of the list of committees which met more than 100 times and mainly in open session. The committee closed only six of 199 meetings for a secrecy score of 3%.

Other House committees which met more than 100 times with comparatively few closed sessions were Interior and Insular Affairs, 20% closed sessions; Government Operations, 22%; Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 24%; Foreign Affairs, 28%; Public Works and Merchant Marine and Fisheries, both with 31%.

Judiciary was the leader among Senate committees which met more than 100 times and had a low percentage of executive sessions. It closed only 15% of 167 meetings. Both the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and the [illegible] Committee closed 20% of their meetings; Commerce, 21%; Appropriations, 30%.

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970—the first reform act in 24 years—was designed, in part, to open up committee proceedings to public scrutiny.

It included provisions for the public announcement of committee roll call votes and coverage of hearings by radio and television.

The act stipulated that Senate committee business meetings are to be open, except for mark-up (when a committee revises and decides on the final language of a bill) and voting sessions or when the committee closes them by majority vote.

Of those Senate committee meetings specifically designated in the Congressional Record as business sessions — organizing, marking-up, voting, briefing sessions—97% were closed to the public in 1971.

According to the reorganization act, House committee business meetings are to be open, except when the committee closes them by majority vote.

Excluding the House Appropriations Committee, 79% of the sessions listed as business were held behind closed doors. (House Appropriations subcommittee mark-up sessions are not reported to the Record.)

Public mark-up sessions are rare. Most committees prefer to write legislation in private for a variety of reasons. Some members believe that open meetings tend to encourage greater speeches for public consumption. Others think committee action is hindered by the necessity of observing formal procedures.

Inhibition Charged

Another objection is that open meetings inhibit the free exchange of ideas. One committee, which has held open mark-up sessions in the past, found that such meetings usually attracted more lobbyists than public.

The House Education and Labor Committee led in open business meetings. It closed its doors only six times out of 60.

Congressional Quarterly's statistics on open and closed committee meetings are derived from the daily digest section of the Congressional Record. Although required by the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act, not all committee meetings are actually listed in the Record.

Committees use different criteria for defining a meeting. Some do not report their meetings regularly to the Record.

WASHINGTON POST
20 FEB 1972 STATINTL

Hill Committees Met Secretly One-Third of Time in 1971

Congressional Quarterly

Congressional committee met in secret one-third of the time last year.

Congressional Quarterly's annual tabulation of committee sessions showed 36 per cent were held behind closed doors in 1971, the year a new law—aimed at opening meetings to the public—went into effect.

This marked a decrease from the 41 per cent closed committee sessions recorded in 1970, but matched the 36 per cent secrecy score for 1969.

Since 1953, when Congressional Quarterly began its annual tally, the highest secrecy score was 43 per cent in 1968. The record low was 30 per cent closed sessions in 1959.

The House, as usual, topped the Senate in the number of executive sessions. The public was barred from 41 per cent—1,131 out of 27,858 of its committee sessions. This was a decrease from the 48 per cent of 1970 but comparable to the 42 per cent recorded in 1969.

Senate committees had a secrecy score of 30 per cent—down from the 33 per cent of 1970 but up from the 28 per cent in 1969. It closed 580 of its 1,905 meetings.

Most noteworthy in 1971 was the opening of selected House Appropriations Committee hearings.

Although only eight per cent of its sessions—36 out of a total of 455—were open, this was in contrast to the zero per cent recorded in the past.

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970—the first reform act in 24 years—was designed, in part, to open up committee proceedings to public scrutiny.

It stipulated that Senate committee business meetings are to be open, except for markup (when a committee revises and decides on the final language of a bill) and voting sessions, or when the committee closes them by majority vote.

Ninety-seven per cent of those Senate committee meetings specifically designated in the Congressional Record as business sessions—organizing, markup, voting, briefing sessions—were closed to the public in 1971.

According to the reorganzation act, House committee business meetings, are to be open, except when the committee closes them by majority vote.

Excluding the House Appropriations Committee, 79 per cent of the sessions listed as business were held behind closed doors. (House Appropriations subcommittee markup sessions are not reported to the Record.)

WASHINGTON MONTHLY
JAN 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

The Billions in the White House Basement

by Timothy H. Ingram

By cliche, the power of the purse is now widely referred to as Congress' only remaining lever for redressing the balance between itself and the presidency. Increasingly, Congress is recognizing that its foreign affairs and treaty-making functions are mere ornaments, and that its traditional checks on the Executive are either unrealistic or meaningless. What is left is the appropriations power, and a handful of senators and representatives are invoking it in a muted but growing struggle to revive congressional strength.

Few appreciate, however, the extent to which even the power of the purse, that bulwark of legislative authority, is already controlled by the presidency. As Congress attempts to tame the Executive by threatening to cut off funds for things like war, it finds that the Executive has already developed innumerable devices for getting the money, anyway. And far from successfully denying the President his money, Congress is even having a hard time getting him to spend what is appropriated.

Timothy Ingram, formerly with public television's "The Advocates," is a Washington writer.

The Constitution, of course, says that the appropriations power is the exclusive prerogative of Congress. But in the vacuum created by Congressional indifference to overseeing the bureaucracy's spending habits, and by the now empty ritual of blue-penciling the President's annual budget, the Executive has amassed a mound of spending prerogatives of its own: transfer authorities, contingency funds, lump-sum appropriations, reprogrammings, special waiver authorities, and covert financing.

A look at several discretionary spending options will give some idea of the extent of the Executive's grasp of the purse strings—and some indication of what Congress is left holding. For example, through secrecy, transfer powers, mislabelled military assistance, unauthorized commitments, and cloaked grants of excess war goods, the President and his national security managers are able to hire mercenaries, discourage a rump insurrection in Ceylon, promise South Korea $3.5 billion, and turn over an unknown amount of equipment, helicopters, and bases to Vietnam. A simple budgetary procedure called reprogramming allows the Navy to quietly secure a behind-the-doors reversal of a congressional decision to defer production of the controversial F-14 fighter. And the pipeline, a huge reservoir of unexpended funds, permits the Pentagon to spend above the level of appropriations authorized by Congress. While lamenting the loss of its war powers, Congress consoles itself with the thought that it still maintains control over domestic priorities by its annual allotment of funds. But through impoundment, the President refuses to spend some $12 billion in appropriated monies, placing a post mortem item veto on such programs as urban renewal, regional medical clinics, food stamps, and farm loans.

The panoply of deceptive devices available to the Executive's budgetary Houdinis was graphically illustrated in a memo submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary Laird on August 30,1971. According to *The New York Times*, the Joint Chiefs offered several ways of by-passing the limited military aid authorized by Congress to generate an additional $52 million or more, to increase the strength of the Cambodian Army.

The first would be simply to transfer $52 million appropriated for economic aid to the military aid program. The second would be to use economic aid money to buy all "common use" items such as trucks and jeeps, which have military as well as civilian value, thus freeing the other funds for strictly military uses. The third would be to increase procurement for the U. S. Army by $52 million and give the materiel to the Cambodians, for "repayment" later. The fourth would be to make some exceptions in Defense Department supply regulations, declaring equipment to be "excess" and delivering it to the Cambodians.

In addition, the memo proposed, the Joint Chiefs would clandestinely provide for a mechanized brigade, an artillery brigade, and coastal patrol units, as well as ground troops and extensive logistic support. AID would help finance the paramilitary force of armed civilians, which the planners hoped would number 200,000 by mid-1973 and more than 500,000 in 1977. The CIA, with its secret budget, supposedly would help train and direct Cambodian military units, as it is now doing with Laotian and Thai troops in Laos, and would provide airlift support with its subsidized airline, Air America. The proposals represented a complete subversion of congressional authority.

But the real significance of the story was not reported: how commonplace these methods have become. The Executive devices are as widespread as they are ingenious.

continued

HAZELTON, PA.
STANDARD-SPEAKER

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DEC 4 1971

Nixon's Foreign Policy Triumph

The Senate is not lacking in would-be foreign policy makers. Led by Fulbright, Mansfield, Symington, Church and Cooper, they have been trying to change the Senate's "advise and consent" prerogative to order the President to "yield and carry out" its policy. After a whole first session struggle in the current Congress when the effort collapsed. It signaled President Nixon's biggest foreign policy triumph, one that may set the principle of the ascendancy of the Presidency in matters of foreign policy.

The triumph was on three successive votes on the defense appropriation. By a 54 to 39 vote, the Senate deleted from the bill an amendment by Senator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, that would have reduced the American forces in Western Europe to 250,000 men by June 15. The President's letter to John Stennis. chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, pointed out that a substantially unilateral reduction would be a mistake and added:

"Passage of the proposed troop cut would, with one stroke, diminish Western military capability in Europe and signal to friend and adversary alike a disarray and weakness in the American government. It would undermine vitally important new initiatives for peace in Moscow and Peking."

The Amendment had been adopted by the Appropriation Committee by 15 to 14, but the letter tipped the balance against it on the floor, when its full import was realized.

Just as significant was a decision by Senator John Sherman Cooper, Kentucky Republican not to co-sponsor with Senator Frank Church, Idaho Democrat, another hostile Amendment. It provided that funds could be used only to carry out the policy enunciated in an earlier Mansfield Amendment to withdraw all forces from Indochina promptly by a certain date, and subject only to the release of American prisoners of war. Nixon had flatly refused to be bound by this Mansfield Amendment, and said that he would not change his policy of relating withdrawals to the level of enemy activity, the survival of the Thieu government and the progress in peace negotiations. Cooper's retreat left the President unchallenged in his withdrawal policy.

Finally, Senator Stuart Symington's amendment to impose a $4 billion ceiling on spending by all intelligence agencies of the executive branch — primarily the Central Intelligence Agency — produced the first critical discussion in recent years of the secrecy surrounding appropriations for intelligence purposes. The total figure was never mentioned, but is said to be $6 billion. The Senate defeated this amendment 56 to 31.

The triple confrontation with the President was over and the $70.8 billion defense appropriation bill was passed, 80 to 5, the last major appropriation measure of the session. The doves are now licking their wounds.

ST. LOUIS, MO
POST-DISPATCH

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NOV 26 1971

Spy Budget Secrecy May End

By TAYLOR PENSONEAU

A Staff Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Nov. 26.

THE BELEAGUERED CONGRESSIONAL minority that has fought to pry loose the Government's secret figures on intelligence expenditures mounted a challenge this week, that though unsuccessful, may make the objective more attainable.

Although an attempt by Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, to limit intelligence outlays was rebuffed by the Senate as expected, an increasing number of members—including some of Symington's opponents—predicted that the day would come when Congress was no longer in the dark on the country's undercover activities.

Possibly most significant, the debate on Symington's proposal brought out that the seemingly broad war being organized and financed in Laos by the Central Intelligence Agency may finally persuade some previously hesitant members of Congress to assert themselves more in this ticklish field.

THE MOST SUCCINCT appraisal of Symington's effort came from one of the opponents, Senator Charles Mathias Jr. (Rep.), Maryland, who remarked moments before the vote that the Missourian had focused "our attention on water that is not only muddy, but actually murky."

"Many members may be reluctant to stir this water for fear of what they may find," Mathias said. "I think we cannot delay much longer in turning our attention in this direction for fear that what is there may evade our examination and our concern."

This feeling may be realized sooner than expected because a number of Senators, in the wake of the Symington matter, said they would push for an executive session by the Senate to consider the intelligence question. It could mean a major breakthrough for those of Symington's persuasion—especially if a censored transcript was made public later.

SYMINGTON sought to amend the Department of Defense appropriations bill for fiscal 1972 to place a 4-billion-dollar ceiling on intelligence outlays. Most estimates put this yearly expenditure currently at more than 5 billion dollars.

The proposed limit, which the Senate rejected Tuesday 56 to 31, would have applied to the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and undercover endeavors by the armed forces.

Many observers regard Symington's move as the most determined attempt yet to force Congress to account at least somewhat for the activities of these agencies.

Although waste and duplication in many of the intelligence operations were given as the most obvious reasons for the amendment, the greater intent was to provide Congress, and the American public, with more insight into both the domestic and foreign activities of these agencies.

USING HIMSELF as an example, Symington contended that he had been unable to determine the appropriations this year for intelligence, even though he is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee as well as an ex-officio member of the Appropriations Committee.

Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, asserted in the debate Tuesday that the Missourian should not feel insulted because nobody had discovered where the intelligence funds were in the defense appropriations measure.

"When they read a line item and find that there is so much for aircraft, or for a carrier, those may or may not be the real amounts," Fulbright said.

REPLYING Senator Allen J. Ellender (Dem.), Louisiana, chairman of the Appropriations Committee and a main opponent of Symington's amendment said that there was no specific appropriations for intelligence activities. "They are funded from many different appropriations included in the bill," he said.

Much of the argument this week centered on the CIA, which came under congressional scrutiny earlier this year for its clandestine role in the [illegible] tions of Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. In his support [illegible] bright was particularly critical of the CIA.

"One of the things that worries me most of all is that I do not see any reason why we should pass appropriations for the CIA to organize an army, pay the troops and conduct a full-scale war in Laos," Fulbright said.

"Yet people of this country think we have a democracy in which a war, if one is to be fought, has to be declared by Congress. Yet Congress did not know about the war in Laos until it was well under way."

When prodded by fellow Senators, Ellender conceded that he did not know in advance about CIA financing of any army in Laos. He said further that he had "never asked, to begin with, whether or not there were any funds to carry on the war in this sum the CIA has asked for."

"It never dawned on me to ask about it," Ellender said. "I did see it publicized in the newspapers some time ago."

Fulbright and his allies pointed to Ellender's statement as a prime example of the necessity for greater congressional awareness of undercover activities.

Ellender became a prime target of the Symington side because of an occurrence last week that the Missourian related to the Senate Tuesday. Symington, when asking staff members of the Appropriations Committee about intelligence figures, was told that they could discuss the matter only with Ellender and four other senior members of the panel.

"THIS MEANS that these billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money are being authorized and appropriated by the Senate with the knowledge and approval of just five of its members," Symington contended. The other four are Senators John L. McClellan (Dem.), Arkansas; John C. Stennis (Dem.), Mississippi; Milton R. Young (Rep), North Dakota, and Margaret Chase Smith (Rep.), Maine.

Symington's mention of this matter constituted an attack on the system and, therefore, possibly his strongest jab of the day. As the argument ensued, one of the five [illegible] near Symington answered, "but why aren't the rest of us to be trusted, too?"

Ellender was not hushed in his rebuttal as he told the Senate that "this method of appropriating funds for these intelligence activities has been in effect for at least 20 years that I know of, since I have been on the committee."

Only a few persons consider these funding requests because of the sensitivity of the subject, Ellender said. In addition, he expressed an opinion of many of Symington's opponents in saying that the intelligence field was too much of a hot potato to "discuss in the open."

THIS APPROACH was adopted by Young also, who asserted that proper defense of the CIA in the debate would require documentation of activities that could not be done.

"Spying is a dirty business, but it is a business every nation in the world engages in," Young said. "Russia does a bigger job of it than we do. You can not disclose secret information."

In an action earlier this year against the use of intelligence funds, the Senate passed a bill that would provide $35,000,000 in fiscal 1972 for financing the operations of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty through the Secretary of State.

The measure, sponsored by Senator Clifford P. Case (Rep.), New Jersey, is intended to divorce the CIA from the funding of the stations. Radio Free Europe, beamed to eastern Europe, and Radio Liberty, beamed to the Soviet Union, operate in West Germany, ostensibly on private contributions.

However, Case said in January that funds had been expended from secret CIA budgets to pay almost totally for the costs of the stations.

The House has approved a bill providing for a commission to conduct a two-year study of the stations. Continued funding of them would be channeled through the commission. A compromise between the two bills will have to be worked out in a conference between the two houses of Congress.

WASHINGTON POST
24 NOV 1971

STATINTL

Intelligence Outlay Ceiling Is Rejected by Senate, 56-31

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

After a sharp debate punctuated by such shouts as "the Senate is due an explanation" and "I can be trusted," the Senate last night voted 56 to 31 against an amendment to put a ceiling on spending by government intelligence agencies.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), in offering the amendment to the defense money bill, said his purpose was to let Congress in on what American intelligence operatives are already doing and plan to do in this country and abroad.

"The point," he told the senators during the dinner-hour debate, 'is to state that we do not have the facts required to allocate the resources of the country."

Symington and his allies thus made the stiffest challenge yet to the way Congress tries to keep track of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and the separate intelligence arms of the Army, Navy and Air Force, operations which altogether reportedly cost some $6 billion a year.

"There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA," Symington said, 'and the same is true of other intelligence agencies of the government."

As a case in point, Symington cited the Central Intelligence subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee which is chaired by Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.).

When Stennis during the debate said "it is so tragic" to try to limit intelligence operations through hasty action on the Senate floor, Symington shouted in reply: "I wish his interest was such he had just one meeting, just one meeting."

The Missourian said he did not know how much the various intelligence agencies of the government spent in any one year, adding that he understood published estimates of $6 billion were too high. But his amendment, in an attempt to force an accounting, would have limited total spending by all the various agencies to $4 billion in the fiscal year starting next July 1.

Chairman Allen J. Ellender (D-La.) of the Senate Appropriations Committee and its Intelligence Operations subcommittee said during the debate he could not tell fellow senators how much is spent on intelligence because "that's a top secret."

Ellender conceded under questioning by fellow senators that he did not know in advance about the CIA's financing of any army in Laos. Symington's allies, especially Chairman J. W. Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee, argued that such lack of congressional knowledge about worldwide activities demonstrated the need for more accountability.

"One of the things that worries me most of all is the CIA going off and conducting a war of its own," Fulbright said. He disputed Stennis' contention that revealing the total budgets of intelligence agencies would disclose any military secrets.

"I don't believe it is tragic" for the Senate to demand the information through such a device as the Symington amendment, Fulbright said. "The Senate is due an explanation."

Symington at one point shouted "I can be trusted" in expressing his frustration in being kept in the dark about covert intelligence operations. He said such lack of information undercut his effort to vote sensibly on the allocation of the nation's resources.

Several senators expressed uneasiness over the White House's recently announced reorganization of intelligence functions. "No doubt about it," Symington said of the reorganization, "we're putting intelligence in the hands of the military."

Stennis, in declaring that Congress in its own laws creating the agencies stressed the need for secrecy on intelligence operations, said to his fellow senators: "You're just going to have to make up your mind that you can't have an accounting — shut your eyes and take what comes."

He promised that the Senate Armed Services Committee would conduct an in-depth analysis of the nation's intelligence activities, including the restructuring recently ordered by the White House.

In the meantime, Stennis said, "The only thing to do is vote this amendment down" and work for reforms in a more orderly fashion.

STATINTL

ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH

STATINTL

[redacted]

Symington Wants Cut In Intelligence Spending

STATINTL

By a Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Nov. 23—Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, in a major attack on secrecy in government, proposed today that Congress cut intelligence expenditures from more than 5 billion dollars to a mandatory ceiling of 4 billions.

He charged, in a speech prepared for delivery, that present intelligence operations were wasteful, overlapping and inadequately supervised by Congress.

In a reference to the Indochina war, he said that he believed "at least one war" could have been avoided if it had not been for "pressures, combined with unwarranted secrecy," on the part of the intelligence agencies.

Symington's proposed ceiling would apply to the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and all other intelligence units, including those within the branches of the armed services.

He said that he had not been able to determine how much was being appropriated this year for intelligence operations, although he is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee and an exofficio member of the Appropriations Committee.

When the final draft of the military appropriations bill was before the defense appropriations subcommittee last week, he said, no mention was made of the multibillion-dollar appropriation requests that it contained for much of the 15 intelligence operating or advisory operations.

After the meeting, he said, he asked the committee staff "in general about intelligence appropriations." He said he was told that the staff had been instructed to talk about those appropriations only with five senior members of the committee—chairman Allen J. Ellender (Dem.), Louisiana, and Senators John L. McClellan (Dem.), Arkansas; John C. Stennis (Dem.), Mississippi; Milton R. Young (Rep.), North Dakota, and Margaret Chase Smith (Rep.), Maine.

Symington said he had the greatest respect for the five members, "but I do not believe that they, and they alone, should render final decision on both said authorizations and appropriations without the knowledge, let alone the approval, of any other Senators, including those on the Armed Services Committee who are not on this five-member subcommittee of appropriations, and all members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee."

Symington quoted press estimates that put intelligence expenditures at 5 to 6 billion dollars a year. He said that despite his committee assignments he had been unable to say whether these estimates were accurate. Another Senate source termed them fairly accurate.

The Senator renewed his criticism of a reorganization of the intelligence machinery announced earlier this month by President Richard M. Nixon.

He said it could mean turning intelligence operations over to the military, thus leading to billions of dollars in additional and often unnecessary defense expenditures, because military estimates of enemy plans, programs and production tend to be higher than civilian estimates.

He objected also that the reorganization put policy control of intelligence in a new committee in the White House, headed by Henry A. Kissinger, presidential assistant for national security affairs.

"This gives executive privilege to the final policymakers and therefore, except for the power of the purse, enables the policymakers to, in effect, take the entire question of intelligence out of the hands of Congress," he said.

Symington had charged earlier this year that Kissinger, rather than Secretary of State William P. Rogers, had become the President chief adviser on foreign policy and, unlike Rogers was not available for questioning by Senate committees.

He complained recently that the change in intelligence arrangements had not been discussed with anyone in the Senate. He said today that Kissinger had called him and said that Symington was correct and that the change should have been discussed with the proper committees of Congress.

Symington said it was nonsense for anyone to think that a high degree of secrecy was necessary for intelligence operations.

He pointed out that congressional and public discussions constantly referred to the costs of such new weapons as the nuclear aircraft carrier, the C-5A transport plane or the main battle tank. These discussions do not go into how these weapons would be used in a war, he said.

"By the same token, knowledge of the over-all cost of intelligence does not in any way entail the release of knowledge about how the various intelligence groups function or plan to function," he said.

"Why should there be greater danger to the national security in making public over-all intelligence costs than in making public other over-all security costs?"

NATION
15 NOV 1971

EXECUTIVE SHELL GAME

HIDING BILLIONS FROM CONGRESS

LOUIS FISHER
Mr. Fisher is the author of President and Congress: Power and Policy, *to be published by the Free Press in January.*

According to the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, it is the policy of Congress that the accounting of the government provide "full disclosure of the results of financial operations, adequate financial information needed in the management of operations and the formulation and execution of the Budget, and effective control over income, expenditures, funds, property, and other assets." Despite that general policy, it has been estimated that, in a budget for fiscal 1972 of $229.2 billion, secret funds may amount to $15 billion to $20 billion.

The financing of the war in Vietnam illustrates how billions can be spent for programs known to relatively few Congressmen. In September 1966, President Johnson expressed his "deep admiration as well as that of the American people for the action recently taken by the Philippines to send a civic action group of 2,000 men to assist the Vietnamese in resisting aggression and rebuilding their country." Other announcements from the White House created the impression that not only the Philippines but Thailand, South Korea, and other members of the "Free World Forces" had volunteered troops.

However, hearings held by the Symington subcommittee in 1969 and 1970 revealed that the United States had offered sizable subsidies to countries that involved themselves in Vietnam. It was learned that the Philippines had received river patrol craft, engineering equipment, a special overseas allowance for its soldiers sent to Vietnam, and additional equipment to strengthen Filipino forces at home. It cost the United States $38.8 million to send one Filipino construction battalion to Vietnam. Senator Fulbright said that as he saw it, "all we did was go over and hire their soldiers in order to support our then administration's view that so many people were in sympathy with our war in Vietnam."

The Philippine Government denied that U.S. contributions represented a subsidy or a fee in return for the sending of the construction battalion, but an investigation by the General Accounting Office confirmed that *"quid pro quo* assistance" had indeed been given. Moreover, there was evidence that the Johnson administration had increased other forms of military and economic aid to the Philippines in exchange for its commitment of a battalion to Vietnam.

> Mr. Fisher's article is the second of three which *The Nation* is running this fall on the elusive ways whereby accounts are kept, and expenses budgeted, by the federal government. "Military Budget: Double-Talk Bookkeeping" by Richard F. Kaufman appeared in the issue of November 1; an article by Sen. Frank Church on the executive's power to impound funds authorized by the Congress will be published soon.

The Symington subcommittee also uncovered an agreement that the Johnson administration had made with the Royal Thai Government, back in 1967, to cover any additional costs connected with the sending of Thai soldiers to Vietnam. The State Department estimated that U.S. support to Thai forces—including payment of overseas allowances—came to approximately $200 million. A number of other expenses were also involved, such as modernization of Thai forces and the development of an anti-aircraft Hawk battery in Thailand. The Foreign Ministry of Thailand denied that the United States had offered payments to induce Thailand to send armed forces to Vietnam, but GAO investigators revealed that U.S. funds had been used for such purposes as the training of Thai troops, payment of overseas allowances, and payment of separation bonuses to Thai soldiers who had served in Vietnam. An interim GAO report estimated that the U.S. Government had invested "probably more than $260 million in equipment, allowances, subsistence, construction, military sales concessions, and other support to the Thais for their contribution under the Free World Military Assistance program to Vietnam."

U.S. subsidies were used once again to facilitate the sending of South Korean forces to Vietnam. Assistance included equipment to modernize Korean forces at home, equipment and all additional costs to cover the deployment of Korean troops in Vietnam, additional loans from the Agency for International Development, and increased ammunition and communications facilities in Korea. To assure that the dispatch of men to Vietnam would not weaken the defensive capabilities of the Republic of Korea, the Johnson administration agreed to finance the training of forces to replace those deployed in Vietnam and to improve South Korea's anti-infiltration capability. From fiscal 1965 to fiscal 1970, Korea's military presence in Vietnam was estimated to have cost the United States $927.5 million.

The legal basis for this assistance to free world forces in Vietnam derives from authorization and appropriation statutes of 1966. Funds were made available to support Vietnamese "and other free world forces in Vietnam, and related costs . . . on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine." In 1967 assistance was broadened to include local forces in Laos and Thailand. Reports on such expenditures were submitted only to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of each house. One would not know from the general language of the statutes what type of financial arrangement the Administration might enter into, or with what country. Even staff people who had access to the reports said that they did not know the nature and dimension of financing the free world forces until hearings were held by the Symington subcommittee.

Legislation in 1969 and 1970 tightened up the language of the statutes somewhat by placing a ceiling on the funds that could be [illegible] ceilings were also established for payments of overseas allowances. The

continued

NEW YORK TIMES
9 NOV 1971

STATINTL

[redacted]

Fulbright Threatens to Fight Extension on Aid

By FELIX BELAIR Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 8—Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, served notice today that he would fight extension beyond next Monday of the continuing resolution that provides foreign-aid spending authority, unless the committee's $3.3-billion bill was acted on by that time.

Senator Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, made his announcement in a letter to the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. The announcement could mean that more than 4,000 employes of the Agency for International Development would lose their jobs if the committee bill was not approved by the Monday deadline.

Fulbright Cites a Prohibition

Since the current fiscal year began, on July 1, the agency, which administers foreign aid, has been operating under a continuing resolution that expires at midnight Monday. To prevent wholesale dismissals and a cut-off of all aid spending, the House is scheduled to act tomorrow on thte solution for a 30-day extension. Follow-up approval by the Senate has been a formality in the past.

However, in his letter to the committee chairman, Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana, Senator Fulbright said that he would invoke a provision written into the law last year. The provision, never invoked, prohibits the use of a continuing resolution unless authorizing legislation is peding in both houses of Congress.

Senator Fulbright suggested that the time had come to implement the prohibition in view of the Senate's defeat Oct. 30 of the authorizing legislation and "the great uncertainty surrounding the future of the entire foreign aid program."

"To allow continuation of appropriations for foreign aid and military sales under the circumstances would make this restriction a nullity and create precisely the type of situation which the provision was designed to correct," Senator Fulbright added.

He specifically requested that any provision for additional funding of foreign aid programs or personnel be deleted from the House's continuing resolution "until Congress has enacted an authorization bill."

Versions Must Agree

Congressional enactment requires not only passage of legislation by both houses but separate approval of a conference report resolving differences between the Senate and House versions. Observers agreed that to accomplish this by Monday would require a burst of speed unequalled since the early days of the New Deal.

Pending action on the committee's truncated version of the Administration's $3.5-billion request, Senator Fulbright suggested that the necessity of terminating the employment of A.I.D. employes would not arise until Nov. 23, rather than Nov. 15, as Administration spokesmen contend.

The Senator is understood to have obtained an informal opinion from the Controller General that the agency could meet its Nov. 23 payroll "because of the lag between the end of pay periods and actual payment of salaries."

The resolution that the House will considered tomorrow would extend foreign-aid spending authority for 30 days beyond Monday, or until adjournment of the present Congressional session. It would be at the same annual spending rate of $2.6-billion that Congress appropriated for last year.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
11 OCT 1971

THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

A FORMER CIA EXECUTIVE DEFENDS ITS OPERATIONS

Just how valid are the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? What guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight control? A point-by-point defense of the organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years.

THE REPLY

Following is an analysis of intelligence operations by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States Government, reporting to the President. Ever since that date it has been subjected to criticism both at home and abroad: for what it has allegedly done as well as for what it has failed to do.

Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.

It should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization described as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.

It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA—first as inspector general, then as executive director-comptroller—to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Central Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates.

It is with this as background that I comment on the current allegations, none of which are original with this critic but any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.

CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too Big

This raises the questions of how much we are willing to pay for national security, and how much is enough.

First, what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the other intelligence organizations of our Government?

Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with insuring that the United States learns as far in advance as possible of any potential threats to our national interests. A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this actually means. It can range all the way from Russian missiles pointed at North America to threats to U. S. ships or bases, to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect. It is the interface of world competition between superior powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limitation of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic requirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be less and that not every disturbance in every part of the world came into their purview.

(Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U. S. means to intervene. It does mean that when there is a boundary dispute or major disagreement between other nations, the U. S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U. S. policy makers that they be kept informed.)

What this means for our intelligence system is worldwide coverage.

To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Administration in Washington that has not been actively concerned with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Administrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight con-



Mr. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now professor of political science at Brown University, joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and advanced to assistant director, inspector general and executive director-comptroller before leaving in 1965. He has written extensively on intelligence and espionage. Among other honors, he holds the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

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Congress would like to know

What does the CIA do?

By Jack McWethy
Congressional Quarterly
Washington

Since Congress created the ultra-secret Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, a growing number of members have been itching to find out more about what their creation does.

The push is on again this year, with impetus being provided by disclosures that the United States is involved in a clandestine war in Laos that Congress didn't know about.

More than a dozen bills have been introduced this spring and summer aimed at removing some of the legal blinders Congress put on itself with respect to the CIA. Some would allow the legislative branch to share more fully in the agency's intelligence information.

In the last two decades, nearly 100 bills have been introduced aimed at easing the tension between an uninformed Congress and an uninformative CIA. Not one bill has passed and only two have been put to a vote. As a result, the CIA remains a mystery even to the body that voted it into existence.

The agency is so secret that some members of Congress who are supposed to know about CIA activities — members of the four highly select intelligence oversight subcommittees — did not know how deeply the CIA figures in the continued existence of the Royal Lao government. CIA oversight is supposed to be conducted by subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

Much to the irritation of some members, the CIA oversight subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee not only keeps its business with the agency a secret, but also keeps the subcommittee's membership a secret from other members of Congress.

Explanation of Secrecy

Paul Wilson, staff director of the House committee, told Congressional Quarterly the membership was a secret "because that's the way it's always been."



The late Allen Dulles, former CIA director

Missouri Democrat Stuart Symington, a member of the Senate Armed Services CIA oversight subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on U.S. commitments abroad, had to send two staff members to the jungles of Laos to find out how extensive the CIA program was in that supposedly neutral country.

"In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos," Symington told a closed session of the Senate June 7.

Nine senators, including Symington, sit on one of the two Senate subcommittees designed to provide legislative oversight of the CIA.

[illegible] not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Despite Symington's claims to the contrary, Braswell told Congressional Quarterly: "The budget is gone into more thoroughly than people (on the committee) would admit. It's just reviewed in a different way than, say, the State Department's budget is."

Braswell said the budget review was at times conducted by a "very select group . . . more select than the five-man subcommittee."

Carte Blanche Authority

Although the CIA was established in 1947, it was not for another two years that Congress granted the agency [illegible] normal legislative oversight.

The 1959 law exempted the CIA from all federal statutes requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. To the CIA director, the law granted the authority to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds."

The Senate Appropriations Committee has a five-man subcommittee with the primary responsibility of reviewing the CIA budget, a figure which later is hidden in the accounts of other government agencies.

According to William W. Woodruff, the one-man staff of the Appropriations oversight subcommittee, the senators discuss more than just the CIA when its director, Richard Helms, testifies.

"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff said. He said Helms also provided the subcommittee with budget estimates for all government intelligence operations, including those not specifically under the jurisdiction of the CIA.

While the House Appropriations Committee veils its oversight operation in secrecy, the House Armed Services Committee just formed a new subcommittee to deal with all aspects of intelligence.

For the last seven months Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D-La., chairman of Armed Services, used the full committee to weight CIA testimony.

"To say the committee was performing any real oversight function was a fiction," said freshman committee member Michael Harrington, a Massachusetts Democrats. The new subcommittee will be under the direction of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich.

No Quilting Society

"I find it very difficult to believe the oversight committees could not obtain some pretty accurate information on how much of that CIA money was going into Laos," commented Sen. Jack Miller, R Iowa, during the Senate's June 7 closed session.

Sen. J. W. Fulbright D Ark., chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, retorted: "It has been said that we all know

Continued

ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE

Kissinger And The Spooks

By Andrew Tully
The McNaught Syndicate, Inc.

WASHINGTON—Shortly after he took over his post as President Nixon's top adviser on national security affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger complained wryly to an aide that "These spooks really tell me more than I want to know about the birth rate in Cambodia."

Kissinger's reference was to the Republic's vast espionage empire, with its nearly 200,000 employes, its "secret" $5-billion annual budget, and its penchant for overwhelming the White House with every scrap of incidental intelligence it can gather.

The story is timely because at long last it appears that something will be done to reduce the size and cost of this empire. Sen. Allen Ellender, D-La., chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, wants to cut $500-million from the total intelligence budget, thereby eliminating 50,000 jobs. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird already is engaged in a reorganization plan to whittle down the size of the enormous military spy shop.

Laird got moving shortly after President Nixon, early this year, ordered a study of all intelligence operations. The prestigious Central Intelligence Agency, which employs a variety of experts ranging from beauticians to nuclear scientists, is also expected to bite the economy bullet, albeit with a certain amount of kicking and screaming.

But the Pentagon will suffer most from the axe, for the simple reason that its intelligence community is the biggest and costliest—and possibly the least efficient. Laird presides over an establishment which includes the Defense Intelligence Agency, intelligence divisions of the three services and the super hush-hush National Security Agency, the nation's code-making and code-breaking apparatus. It is an establishment that employs some 150,000 people and spends an estimated $3-billion a year.

Laird's spies are in trouble with President Nixon. He has been telling the defense Secretary for months that the military spy factory is "too damn big," and that its bigness apparently breeds inefficiency.

Specifically, although he boasted of both operations in public, Nixon was unhappy with the intelligence planning for the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos and the abortive prisoner-of-war raid at Sontay. More recently, he has been "unimpressed"—as he told Laird—with intelligence on Viet Cong hit-and-run attacks in South Vietnam. Both the Pentagon and the CIA got a scolding from the President when they failed to discover Soviet missile installations near the Suez Canal during the summer of 1970.

Nixon also reportedly has cracked down on so-called "politico-sociological" studies conducted within friendly foreign countries by Army Intelligence, or G-2. After complaints from Secretary of State William Rogers, Nixon in July ordered the Pentagon to recall a research group dispatched to Czechoslovakia to prepare an estimate of the chances of a people's revolt.

Rogers is said to have described the project as representing a "dangerous gamble" that could get the U.S. in serious trouble. He compared it with the notorious 1965 "Camelot" project set up to determine the factors involved in promoting and inhibiting revolution in Chile. That operation was cancelled after a strong protest by the Chilean government, but by then it already had cost the taxpayers $1-million.

Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that any administration by itself can reform our swollen intelligence community. Like all bureaucratic baronies, it is a powerful lobby within the administration. No President wants to be accused of restraining, for budgetary reasons, a spy who might discover tomorrow that Red China has invented a new bomb. Eventually, if any real reorganization is to be realized, Congress will have to step in with its power of the purse strings.

But the Nixon administration is indeed making the first meaningful progress in intelligence reform since Harry Truman established the CIA. Even if Congress again shirks its responsibilities, the cost of spying almost surely will be reduced in the next year or two. Richard Nixon has a record for frugality.

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STATINTL STATINTL

WASHINGTON POST

29 SEP 1971

STATINTL

On civilians and intelligence

By ...

U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is reported to be considering a major innovation at the Pentagon, a civilian to be in charge of intelligence gathering and evaluating. And high time.

One of the very big lessons which came out of the "Pentagon Papers" was that Pentagon intelligence was different all through the Vietnam war period from intelligence gathered at CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). And there seems to be little doubt about which was the more reliable.

The Pentagon's intelligence from its own sources was guilty all through of underestimating the capabilities of the other side and of overestimating what various levels of American forces could accomplish. The most pertinent fact about it is that in 1965 Lyndon Johnson agreed to the commitment of a half a million Americans to Vietnam on the assumption that it would be all over successfully in ample time for the 1968 election.

Had President Johnson listened to CIA and State Department intelligence rather than to Pentagon intelligence he would not have made that mistake. Their reports and estimates were consistently closer to reality.

The reason for the difference is plain enough. CIA and State's INR are both staffed by full-time professionals in intelligence work, most of them civilians. There are a good many former military men in these services, but they are men (and women) who have gone permanently into intelligence, not just for a short tour of duty.

Military intelligence is heavily staffed, and always so far headed, by officers to whom it is a temporary duty between regular service tours. They are not professionals devoting their entire time to intelligence. Nor are they civilians who can see such matters from a nonservice-connected point of view. It is difficult for an Army, Navy or Air Force officer to forget his own service when handling intelligence. His inevitable tendency is to hear, see, and stress any information or purported information which will enhance the role of his own service, particularly if he is going on in that service.

Ideally, the Pentagon would take its intelligence from CIA and INR. CIA has no ax to grind but its own, and there is really almost nothing it can want which it doesn't already have — including relative anonymity and total freedom from detailed scrutiny in the Congress. A select committee of Congress goes over its budget every year. Much of it is totally secret. There are never any debates on the CIA budget in Congress. The committee is always generous to CIA. It has no special reason to turn out anything but the most objective intelligence it can manage to produce.

The Pentagon won't take its intelligence from the CIA. Human nature doesn't work like that. But it would help to have a nonservice-connected civilian in charge of Pentagon intelligence. It would reduce the likelihood of another Vietnam war.

WASHINGTON POST
20 SEP 1971

[redacted]

Laird Eyes Civilian for Intelligence

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The White House is expected to approve soon a Pentagon plan which would install, for the first time, a civilian as the top-ranking intelligence official in the Defense Department, according to informed government sources.

The move is part of a more extensive, government-wide reorganization plan, much of which is still unsettled, aimed at making the gathering of all types of military and foreign intelligence more efficient and far less expensive.

Estimates of the current government-wide cost each year for global intelligence gathering, sorting and analyzing run to about $5 billion and involve some 200,000 people.

The bulk of the money—an estimated $3 billion annually—and the people—about 150,000—are associated with the Defense Department.

The Pentagon part of the planned reorganization involves establishment of a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence whose job would be to oversee the entire military network, including the separate activities of all three services plus those of the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is headed by a military man, and the code-cracking National Security Agency.

There are several candidates for the new post. But the man most Pentagon insiders expect to get the job is Dr. Albert C. Hall, currently a vice-president of Martin-Marietta Corp., the company that builds the booster rockets for most of the U.S. spy satellites.

Hall has a reputation as a top-notch engineer and space expert, having been one of the leading space planners in the Pentagon between 1963-65. He is no stranger to the intelligence field, currently heading the Defense Intelligence Agency's science advisory committee.

The new assistant secretary will become the ranking intelligence official in the Pentagon and Defense Secretary Laird's chief intelligence advisor. As Defense officials describe the plan, however, the



1960 AP Picture

ALBERT C. HALL
... may join Pentagon

director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, will also retain direct access to Laird.

The Pentagon has never had a civilian in the top intelligence job before, on a full-time basis. (Last year, after the department was rocked by disclosures of military spying on civilians, Laird named his close friend and then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, Robert F. Froehlke, to also serve as a special assistant for intelligence).

Behind the new move, as Pentagon officials explain it, is a need to cut down the enormous size of the military intelligence community and to weed out unnecessary projects and facilities.

The feeling that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly in comparison to the amount of useful information it was producing was the principal impetus, according to civilian officials, for a White House-ordered study of all intelligence operations earlier this year.

In addition, some sources say that President Nixon, while impressed in large measure with the work of the civilian run Central Intelligence Agency, was unhappy with military intelligence planning going into the abortive Sontay prison raid and the South Vietnamese [illegible] Laos.

Also, the President reportedly was annoyed with the lag in U.S. knowledge of a Soviet cease-fire violation involving construction of SAM missile sites near the Suez Canal during the summer of 1970.

Demands for more efficiency have also come recently from Sen. Allen J. Ellender (D.-La.), chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee. Ellender is threatening to cut $500 million out of the total intelligence budget which might involve eliminating some 50,000 jobs.

Some government officials estimate that actual cuts could run to about 20,000 people and a savings of a few hundred million dollars.

While the Pentagon, as the chief target of the efficiency experts, is about to get some help, proposals for reorganizing the rest of the intelligence community appear to be still involved in bureaucratic infighting.

Plans to create a new super-agency with CIA director Richard Helms as the chief have been dropped, though many officials believe that Helms will eventually emerge with strengthened and broader powers over all intelligence operations and resources.

Plans to put a new intelligence coordinator in the White House are also said to be unsettled, though such a prospect is viewed as likely.

Helms appears to be a central figure in the question of how far the government will go to shake-up the entire intelligence community. While Helms is viewed in all quarters as the top professional in the field, some intelligence experts fear that giving him a job with a bigger administrative work load will dilute his contribution to the overall quality of U.S. intelligence, weaken the tightly knit CIA, and focus even more power in the White House.

[redacted]

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 536,108
S - 709,123
SEP 6 1971

Into a corner?

President Nixon, in refusing to allow a Senate committee to inspect long-term foreign military aid plans, may have painted himself into a corner.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which is in a powerful position, voted in July to suspend all such aid unless the Pentagon discloses its five-year plan.

Mr. Nixon's answer last week was to claim executive privilege, stating that such disclosure was "not in the national interest." There is nothing new in this. President Washington declined in 1796 to give Congress his letters on a treaty with Britain, and at least 17 other Presidents have followed his lead.

For a generation now, the Pentagon—and the White House—have generally been able, through the mention of "national security" to get what they want. But over the last two years, the Congress, particularly the Senate, has been resisting the Daddy-knows-best argument from the White House.

The arms-aid bill is not the only one which could run into trouble as Congress reconvenes. There is a bill calling for Congress to be cut in on the secrets of the Central Intelligence Agency and another limiting the war powers of the President. Both have impressive support.

The Congress is obviously trying to regain some of the powers it has abdicated in 25 years, and Mr. Nixon may find the tide is running against him if he tries to exercise too much dominance over Capitol Hill, as in refusing the request for arms-aid plans.

NEW ORLEANS, LA.
TIMES-PICAYUNE
AUG 30 1971
M - 196,345
S - 308,949

Work of CIA Should Remain Secret

Twenty-four years ago the national legislature created the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency and now there is quite a show of feeling the result was too good from the standpoint of secrecy.

That Congress doesn't know what goes on within the CIA does more than pique curiosity, such as when it finds out about the United States' participation in a Laotian war. It makes many legislators downright put out.

Not that there hasn't been congressional prying before now, but the interest is accentuated. Of almost 200 bills introduced in Congress on the subject, as many as two survived long enough to come to a vote. None has passed.

The CIA oversight subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, it seems, is as hush-hush about the CIA as the CIA itself, which stirs still more consternation on the Hill.

Congress knew when it created the CIA in 1947 that it was setting up no goldfish-bowl agency, so despite criticism about the CIA and its clandestine work it is difficult not to agree with Sen. John C. Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and on its oversight committee, when he says:

"If we are going to have a CIA, and we have to have a CIA, we cannot run it as a quilting society or something like that."

It is easy to hop on the CIA, for the agency cannot answer its critics. That is the nature of its operations.

The charter of the CIA, the National Security Act of 1947, was the culmination of a national resolve that one Pearl Harbor was enough. President Truman said in that year in referring to the Pearl Harbor period, "the military did not know everything the State department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew. The Army and Navy, in fact, had only a very informal arrangement to keep each other informed as to their plans."

So the idea behind the CIA was to coordinate the intelligence elements of the government. Not a law unto itself, it is answerable to those it serves in government.

For the agency to make Congress privy to its secrets would be to have no secret at all, hence no usable foreign intelligence.

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
28 Aug 1971

[redacted]

RADIO FREE EUROPE

The Senate Aug. 2 by voice vote passed a bill (S 18) providing $35-million to fund Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for fiscal 1972.

Although the bill was approved by the Senate without either a word or vote of objection, the action marked the end of an era which the State Department refused to admit ever existed. For 20 years, both radio stations had been operating on covert funding provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, although both the stations and the United States government maintained they were privately owned corporations operating solely through contributed money.

The Foreign Relations Committee report on S 18 (S Rept 92-319) told of the long-standing relationship between the radio stations and the CIA and said: "Executive branch officials refuse publicly to acknowledge the agency's (CIA) participation or role in maintaining and operating the two radios."

References. *CIA special report, Weekly Report p. 1840; committee action, p. 1609; Congress and the Nation Vol. II, p. 852.*

Background. In 1967, at the time the CIA was criticized for allegedly contributing funds to the National Student Association (NSA), President Lyndon B. Johnson made a policy statement declaring that "no federal agency shall provide covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or voluntary organizations."

Clifford P. Case (R N.J.) touched off a debate Jan. 24, 1971, when he recalled the Johnson policy statement and tried to apply it as reason for adopting his bill (S 18) calling for congressionally authorized funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. On Jan. 25, the Nixon Administration, speaking through the State Department, announced that the two radio stations were "not educational or private voluntary organizations" within the United States and, therefore, the Johnson policy statement was not applicable to the situation.

While the Administration refused to accept the argument that the radio stations should not be funded by the CIA because of the 1967 Johnson statement or, indeed, that any such relationship existed, the Case proposal itself attracted attention in the State Department. In response to the Case bill came the Nixon Administration's counter proposal—S 1936.

Under the provisions of S 1936, which was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee May 23, the radio stations would be controlled by a single non-profit, private corporation which was to receive an open-ended authorization without legislative review. Funds would still have to be appropriated by Congress. No government agency was specified to oversee the stations. The corporation, which was to be called the American Council for Private International Communications Inc., was to have an 11-man board of directors appointed by the President.

The Case bill (S 18), on the other hand, required funds for the stations to be authorized and appropriated by Congress under the authority of the U.S. Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948. The State Department was named as the primary recipient of the appropriations for the two stations. Case's proposal recommended a $30-million appropriation for fiscal 1972 only.

Government-Sponsored Radios

The following are brief descriptions of overseas radio stations funded in whole or in part by the United States government:

RADIO FREE EUROPE—Broadcasting to five Communist-governed East European countries—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary—in the native tongue of the region, approximately 18 hours per day; news headquarters in Munich, West Germany; 32 transmitters located in West Germany and Spain; funding until July 1971 provided primarily by the Central Intelligence Agency, with some private contributions—mostly from U.S. corporations; fiscal 1971 budget for both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty was $36.2-million.

RADIO LIBERTY—Broadcasting exclusively to the Soviet Union in 17 dialects; programming around the clock; news headquarters in Munich, West Germany; 17 transmitters in Spain, Taiwan and West Germany; funding until July 1971 provided primarily by the CIA, with some private contributions.

VOICE OF AMERICA—Broadcasting worldwide in 36 languages with 40 percent of air time beamed to Communist-governed countries; 108 medium and shortwave transmitters located throughout the world; fiscal 1971 budget of $41-million included as part of the over-all budget of the United States Information Agency.

Before the Foreign Relations Committee could act on either of the proposals, the Senate Appropriations Committee, under Chairman Allen J. Ellender (D La.), reported June 25 a routine resolution (H J Res 742) providing for the continued funding of certain government agencies until regular fiscal 1972 appropriations could be cleared through Congress. Contained in the resolution as amended by the committee was the first mention ever made in an official public document that the U.S. government was connected with Radio Free Europe or Radio Liberty. The committee had inserted language providing for the continued funding of the two stations, at a level equal to what they had been receiving from the CIA, under provisions of the U.S. Information Act being used by the Case proposal. The committee also included a restraining clause which provided that funds from other government agencies could not be used to support the stations. *(Weekly Report p. 1805)*

Although the routine resolution which contained the precedent-setting language failed to arouse a stir in the United States, the significance of H J Res 742 was not lost on the Soviet Union. In a July issue of *Pravda*, the Communist party newspaper discussed the resolution, saying the United States was at last admitting they supported the anti-Communist radio stations which had for two decades been devoted to undermining the Soviet system.

The Nixon Administration, however, has made no admissions despite efforts by the Foreign Relations Committee to obtain a public statement regarding the radio stations from the State Department.

continued

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
6 August 1970

On the Issues

[redacted]

[redacted]

CIA: CONGRESS IN DARK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, SPENDING

[redacted]

Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given authority in 1949 to operate without normal legislative oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an uninformed Congress and an uninformative CIA.

In the last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at making the CIA more accountable to the legislative branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been reported from committee. None has been adopted.

The push is on again. Some members of Congress are insisting they should know more about the CIA and about what the CIA knows. The clandestine military operations in Laos run by the CIA appear to be this year's impetus.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D Mo.), a member of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the Senate June 7 behind closed doors on how deeply the CIA was involved in the Laotian turmoil. He based his briefing on a staff report. *(Weekly Report p. 1709, 1660, 1268)*

He told the Senate in that closed session: "In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos. We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do not know about the people we maintain there. It is a secret war."

As a member of two key subcommittees dealing with the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to more classified information about the agency than most other members of Congress. But Symington told the Senate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to Laos in order to find out what the CIA was doing.

If Symington does not know what the CIA has been doing, then what kind of oversight function does Congress exercise over the super-secret organization? *(Secrecy fact sheet, Weekly Report p. 1785)*

A Congressional Quarterly examination of the oversight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA and interviews with key staff members and members of Congress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge about CIA activities and expenditures rests in the hands of four powerful committee chairmen and several key members of their committees—Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

The extent to which these men exercise their power in ferreting out the details of what the CIA does with its secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted into existence 24 years ago.

The CIA Answers to...

As established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-253), the Central Intelligence Agency was accountable to the President and the National Security Council. In the original Act there was no language which excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also no provision which required such examination.

To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intelligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organization in 1949, its budgeted funds have been submerged into the general accounts of other government agencies, hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a select group of ranking members of Congress. *(Congress and the Nation Vol. I, p. 306, 249)*

THE SENATE

In the Senate, the system by which committees check on CIA activities and budget requests is straightforward. Nine men—on two committees—hold positions of seniority which allow them to participate in the regular annual legislative oversight function. Other committees are briefed by the CIA, but only on topical matters and not on a regular basis.

Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel for the Senate Appropriations Committee and the only staff man for the oversight subcommittee, explained that when the CIA comes before the five-man subcommittee, more is discussed than just the CIA's budget.

"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff told Congressional Quarterly. He said that CIA Director Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence operations.

Woodruff explained that although the oversight subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA budget, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency would originate in the Armed Services Committee, not Appropriations.

No transcripts are kept when the CIA representative (usually Helms) testifies before the subcommittee. Woodruff said the material covered in the hearings was so highly classified that any transcripts would have to be kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he said, "and they're on my desk in an hour."

Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services Committee and the only staff man used by the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee.

continued

LOS ANGELES TIMES
3 JUN 1971

Nixon Studies Shakeup Plans for Intelligence

BY MICHAEL GETLER
Exclusive to The Times from the Washington Post

WASHINGTON — The White House is expected to decide within the next several weeks whether to act on proposals for reorganizing U.S. intelligence operations — particularly those of the military — with the aim of making these vast and far-flung activities more efficient and less expensive.

Several possible reorganization plans have been under study since early this year. Now, however, in addition to some internal Administration pressure to revamp the intelligence apparatus, Congress is also pressing the White House to act.

According to informed congressional sources, Sen. Allen J. Ellender (D-La.), chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee, has threatened to cut at least $500 million out of the roughly $5 billion that the government is estimated to spend annually on all forms of military and foreign intelligence operations.

200,000 in Field

Ellender's action, these sources say, would have the effect of cutting about 50,000 people out of an estimated 200,000 military and civilian personnel engaged in intelligence work.

Ellender's chief targets, sources close to the senator say, are the separate intelligence operations run by each military service and the Pentagon's defense intelligence agency.

Officials have estimated that the military spends about $3 billion of the total amount tucked away for intelligence each year in a variety of appropriations bills.

The uniformed services account for about 150,000 of the total personnel figure.

Ellender is known to be concerned about overlaps between the work of the individual services, too many agents gathering data of doubtful significance, too many admirals and generals doing work that could be done by lower-ranking men, and the setting up of a global communication network that allegedly exceeds the strategic needs of military commanders.

Government officials say that the original impetus for reorganization was also a widespread feeling in the executive branch that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly for the amount of useful intelligence it produced. Also, there was said to be dissatisfaction because the form in which some kinds of intelligence were presented to the White House was not readily usable.

There have also been reports—denied by high-level officials—that the President and his top advisers were unhappy with the military intelligence work that went into the planning of the Son Tay Prison Camp raid in North Vietnam and the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos.

Cabinet-Level Post

Under the original White House study completed last spring, a number of options were developed. The most far-reaching involved creation of a new super-intelligence agency headed by a Cabinet-level officer and combining many of the now separate activities of the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and the huge code-cracking operations of the National Security Agency.

Another option involved movement of CIA Director Richard Helms into the White House as the top intelligence man with increased authority over all aspects of intelligence.

Some officials speculate that the Administration may choose some form of internal consolidation. This probably would involve cutting back on the military side and possibly adding a high-level intelligence coordinator to the White House staff.

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STATINTL

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN

[redacted]

MARIANNE MEANS

Congress Wants CIA Briefings

[redacted]

CIA officials are very concerned about a new Senate move to require their secretive agency to give detailed global intelligence to congressional committees on a regular basis.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled hearings this September on a controversial measure that would greatly expand the number of senators who have access to classified CIA evaluations and information.

The bill, proposed by Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., would require the CIA to brief the full Senate and House Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on a routine schedule, similar to the system under which the agency briefs top foreign policy officials of the executive branch.

ALARMED CIA OFFICIALS view the proposal as potentially jeopardizing their clandestine operations around the world. There are 110 congressmen on those four committees, and that's a lot of people to keep a secret. Consequently the CIA's three congressional liaison agents are trying quietly to have the measure killed.

The Senate however, is in a mood to expand its influence over Presidential foreign policy-making, and better intelligence is a vital tool toward that goal. The measure already has considerable supporters, including Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright, and Sen. Stuart Symington, the only senator on both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

The CIA now reports only to five special subcommittees of the House and Senate, composed of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. These groups are concerned primarily with the CIA budget and operations. The CIA does not regularly brief Fulbright or other congressmen whose major interest is in the field of foreign policy.

SENATE LEADERS COMPLAIN that they are asked to authorize and fund Presidential decisions that may result in U.S. soldiers going into combat but are told little more than the general public about the information and analyses that prompted those decisions. Cooper, a long-time opponent of the war in Vietnam, introduced the bill in the wake of the Pentagon Papers. He was angry to discover from the papers that the CIA had warned President Johnson full-scale bombing of North Vietnam might not frighten Hanoi into giving up.

CIA officials fear that congressmen privy to intelligence secrets will not be able to resist the temptation of leaking — and perhaps misinterpreting — snatches of information that serve their own political purposes or can get them publicity. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in particular has long had a reputation for being a sieve.

But congressmen retort, justifiably, they are no worse at keeping secrets than the White House itself. It is common practice for White House and State Department officials to leak classified documents and secret foreign intelligence when it suits their purpose. For instance, the administration recently surfaced intelligence warnings of new Soviet missile sites to help generate support for military budget items.

Even so, the administration keeps reasonably tight control over the number of officials who have access to CIA intelligence and who have permission to leak selected secrets at the appropriate moments. Congress has no such control over its members, and the odds that an individual congressman might make a grievous error in judgment about what is safe to make public are not inconsiderable.

BALTIMORE SUN
12 JUL 1973

Many In Congress Happy To Stay Ignorant Of Secrets

Some Want Information, But House Voted To Keep Status Quo

By GENE OISHI
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Does Congress really want to know everything the United States government does?

On balance, the answer is probably no, despite a renewed drive in Congress to dislodge foreign policy secrets from the executive branch.

Resolution Rejected

In fact, the House last week rejected, 261 to 118, a resolution asking the State Department for documents related to U.S. bombing and CIA operations in Laos.

Representative Joe D. Waggonner, Jr., (D., La.) said during the debate: "There are some things that some people in this country had better not know for the security and future well-being of this country. Therefore, they [the administration] must keep some information from me and they must keep some information from you for the benefit of the future security of this country. It is better that information as a rule be overclassified than underclassified."

Mr. Waggonner also expressed a widely held view that some members of Congress, if given secret information, could not resist the temptation of leaking some of it "to the New York *Times* or some other whistle blower."

The debate underscored a tacit assumption long held in Congress that the country is better served if legislators—except for a select few—are not told of everything the United States has done or is currently doing in the field of foreign affairs.

Being Challenged

This assumption, however, is now being challenged, unsuccessfully in the case of the House resolution asking for more information on Laos.

But an even more sweeping bill has been introduced in the Senate by John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.), who wants to give every member of Congress regular access to all intelligence reports and analyses prepared for the executive branch by the CIA.



SENATOR COOPER
Seeks more disclosures

Mr. Cooper is one of the most highly regarded members of the Senate, and this is a factor of some importance in its club-like atmosphere in which the success or failure of a bill can hinge on who its sponsor is.

But Senator Cooper—a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee—must get his bill through the Armed Services Committee, which together with the Appropriations Committee has jurisdiction over the CIA. And even without national security considerations, congressional committees instinctively resist encroachment upon their areas of competence.

The last time an attempt was made to break the Armed Services Committee's lock on the CIA was in 1966, when then Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (D., Minn.) made a comparatively modest proposal to create a special CIA committee, made up of representatives of Armed Services, Appropriations and the Foreign Relations committees.

The late Senator Richard B. Russell (D., Ga.), then chairman of the Armed Services Committee, blocked the bill from coming to a floor vote on a procedural point, effectively killing the measure.

The Cooper bill is not likely to get far in the legislative process either. Aside from the jurisdictional problems, most members of Congress appear to be ambivalent about being told too much.



RICHARD HELMS
Knows all the secrets

Leverett Saltonstall, a Massachusetts Republican, was quoted recently as saying when he was a member of the Senate: "They [the CIA] do things I'd just as soon not know about."

Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, at least once a year gives separate intelligence briefings to small groups within the Armed Services and Appropriations committees in both houses of Congress and even to the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee, even though it does not have direct jurisdiction over the agency.

The annual briefings, according to congressional sources, consist of "around-the-world" assessments of the United States' military and intelligence posture. Other special briefings might deal with such topics as deployment and strength of Soviet nuclear missiles.

George H. Mahon (D., Texas), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, and F. Edward Hebert (D., La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said, as did Senate sources, that Mr. Helms has never refused to answer a question during these briefings.

Mr. Hebert said there was only one exception, when he instructed Mr. Helms not to answer a question put to him by a member of his panel.

"I took it on my own responsibility," Mr. Hebert said, "and, of course, I won't tell you what the question was."

Senate sources indicate that senators, too, impose a certain amount of self-censorship during these intelligence briefings. One source said he has never heard a question pertaining to the so-called "dirty tricks" aspect of CIA operations.

"For example," he said, "we've never asked, 'Mr. Helms, how many people did you lose in your clandestine service last year?' Maybe we should ask it, but we never have."

But it is virtually impossible to ascertain precisely what even the select few who attend CIA briefings know about the agency's activities.

As Mr. Mahon, the Appropriations chairman, notes, he picks only those "who won't talk." Then, he refused to say who they are.

He said he was opposed to the Cooper bill, saying, "If you give it [CIA information] to every member of Congress it would be like giving it to the New York *Times*."

Chairman Hebert of Armed Services questioned the need to know everything.

"I don't know everything," he said, "and I'm not bitching about it."

On the other side of the issue, critics of the present system say that congress had deliberately remained ignorant to avoid responsibility.

Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D., N.Y.) said during the House debate last week: "I fear Mr. Speaker, that many of us did not want to know all of the facts of our involvement in Vietnam in 1965 or 1968 or even yesterday. I think that the Congress has remained much too long in self-imposed insulation. . . . We feared that more knowledge would mean more responsibility for us."

Others argued that the information the House was seeking was already well known to the enemy so it could not be withheld for national security reasons. As the House vote indicated, they represented a minority view.

For the moment, at least, the House does not want to share fully in executive branch secrets.

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
26 JUL 1971

STATINTL

[redacted]

THE WORLD TODAY

RADIO FREE EUROPE and Radio Liberty which beam propaganda to Eastern Europe will no longer be financed by the CIA, the Senate Appropriations Committee decided. The committee approved an amendment authorizing the USIA to support the stations.

HACKENSACK, N.J.
RECORD
JUN 15 1971
E - 144,254
S - 164,048

Watchdogs As Coconspirators

Sen. Clifford Case is disturbed, and rightly so, about the power of the Central Intelligence Agency to have his colleagues keep secrets from one another. Especially incensing Mr. Case is the subterfuge by which all the members of the Senate, including those on the Foreign Affairs and Appropriations Committees, were kept in the dark on the United States financing of Thai mercenaries fighting in Laos.

It seems that a tight little Senate watchdog subcommittee was privy for more than a year to the fact that CIA funds were being paid to the Thais but never told their colleagues. This watchdog group was appointed originally to oversee CIA use of funds that are never specified in the agency's budget.

The CIA is a curious organism whose intelligence activities have a considerable effect on United States foreign policy. Often the agency acts as a government within a government. It gathers intelligence data, digests it, and uses the conclusions to mount operations of its own, sometimes without consultation even with the military. Its operation phase is not divorced from its gathering of data. There is, therefore, no check on whether the operations being carried out are consistent with the data gathered or even whether they are in the interest of U.S. global policy.

To curb this almost limitless leeway the congressional watchdog group was appointed in 1955. The committee has met only three times in the past two years. Far from being watchdogs, the committee members appear to have become coconspirators, a role never intended.

Sen. Case's point is well taken. There is room for secrecy in a democracy when the defense of the nation is at stake. There is little room for a kind of secrecy that not only doesn't trust the elected Congress of the United States but causes individual members to keep secrets from one another.

If the public doesn't have a right to know what the CIA is doing, its elected representatives should be presumed to be patriotic enough to know and keep the information to themselves, unless what they discover runs counter to the established policy and law of this country. In the case of the Thai mercenaries this was information that concerned the conduct of the war in Indochina. Congress did not declare this war. Its members should at least have the right of access to information on how and for what reasons it is being continued.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

House Unit Yields Power to Probers

By Jack Anderson

Nothing rankles Washington's legislative lords more than encroachments upon their power. Let the President step across the constitutional line and usurp some congressional prerogative, and there will be holy howls on Capitol Hill.

Yet the mighty House Appropriations Committee, the guardian of the federal purse, has delegated some of its most precious powers to FBI agents, Army auditors and other government gumshoes. There is even one CIA agent assigned to the appropriations panel.

These borrowed bureaucrats are entrusted with investigating their own agencies — the same agencies that not only pay their salaries but will take them back after their hitches on the Hill.

Explained committee aide Frank Sady: "They're familiar with the programs and know what's going on" in their own departments.

The committee's curious recruiting practice not only flies in the face of decades of congressional bombast about the sanctity of the Constitution's separation-of-powers doctrine but depends upon foxes to investigate raids on the chicken coop.

J. Edgar Hoover alone has 30 FBI employees working for the Appropriations Committee. Three serve as professional staff members and three as secretaries on a three-year rotating basis while they continue to draw their FBI pay. The other FBI agents usually spend one to three months away from their regular duties.

Sleuths on Loan

Sleuths are also shanghaied from other federal bureaus, ranging from the Army Audit Agency to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. An Agriculture Department employee, for example, investigated the food stamp program for the committee.

At least six bureaucrats, including the CIA man, are doing menial work for the committee. They answer telephones, check the punctuation in congressional statements and perform other odd jobs. For this, they continue to draw their regular salaries—up to $23,000 a year—from their agencies.

"When we spot a bright young man at a budget hearing or elsewhere," acknowledge Paul Wilson, the committee staff director, "we often have him come over and work for us."

The pay level of the drafted bureaucrats isn't considered. Result: the committee often uses home-run hitters as bat boys.

But no one has been foolhardy enough to turn down a personnel request from the committee that dishes out the dough.

THE NEW YORKER
5 June 1971

[redacted]

LETTER FROM WASHINGTON

THE Central Intelligence Agency seems at times to be the only really intelligent agency we have. Consider the record: The C.I.A. has done more for culture than the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities or the Ford Foundation, publishing highbrow journals in London, Berlin, Paris, and Bombay. It has subsidized student organizations that have formed the nucleus of the anti-war movement and have contributed greatly to the movement's leadership. While the Departments of State and Defense were giving moral and military support to the Portuguese imperialists in Africa, the C.I.A. was said to be covertly and quite effectively aiding the rebels in Angola and Mozambique. To be sure, in Cuba and Vietnam, the C.I.A. hasn't done too well, but you can't win them all. Anyway, it now seems to have surpassed itself—at least in independence and courage—by blowing the whistle on Melvin Laird and his braided alarmists in the Pentagon. It has disputed publicly the official view of the "missile crisis," and while it would be premature to say that it has destroyed the government's case, the presumption must always be that the government's case is overstated to begin with.

The issues here are not particularly complex or technical, though they are, one might say, rather abstract. Much depends on how one evaluates the significance of empty space—in this case, holes in the ground around Moscow. These holes have been seen and counted and measured by our spies on the ground and by our satellites in orbit. The big question is: Why are they there and what are they for? According to Secretary Laird, in a television appearance last March, the intelligence that had reached him confirmed "the fact that the Soviet Union is going forward with construction of a large missile system." By April 22nd, the confirmed fact was, he said, a "sobering" one: the Soviet Union was "involved in a new—and apparently extensive—ICBM construction program." In other words, the Russians were once again playing dirty pool. While sweet-talking at the SALT negotiations, they were digging holes for great big missiles that could sneak right past and around our ABMs, which safeguard us while we sleep—or, at any rate, those of us who live in Montana, North Dakota, Wyoming, and Missouri. In late April, prospects looked bad for the SALT talks, despite the encouraging words of Brezhnev, who made everything sound very simple when, in Tiflis, he said, "All you have to do is to muster resolve to try the proposals that interest you by their taste. Translated into diplomatic language, this means 'Start negotiations.'" All very well, but how can a gentleman negotiate with a cad who is digging bigger and bigger holes on Soviet soil?

Now comes the C.I.A. to strike a blow for sanity and peace. Essentially, its argument is that you can't judge a hole by its size. It does not dispute the military's finding that there are large new cavities in the earth in the environs of Moscow. Nor does it question the possibility that the larger holes could be used to house larger missiles. But it does point out that they could also be used to pour concrete in to protect the smaller missiles they already have. Should this be the case, then it would seem unlikely that the Soviet Union is aiming at what down here in the capital we call a "first-strike capability"—i.e., a sure-fire knockout punch delivered before the gong has sounded. The C.I.A. analysts (who, incidentally, leaked their misgivings and suspicions to Republicans in the Senate) do not prejudge the case, though they do suggest that if the Russians were building great big new missiles, they would be unlikely to plant them in fields of smaller ones. In any case, the C.I.A. has once again challenged Conventional Wisdom. One is particularly taken with the statement of Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., described as a "former" C.I.A. official, who said before the Senate Appropriations Committee, "We must ask ourselves how many times we are going to allow the 'weaponeers' to come before the Congress and the people shouting 'missile gap' when in reality they are only creating another 'credibility gap.'"

—RICHARD H. ROVERE

THE NEW REPUBLIC
1 MAY 1971

CIA on CIA

"I am the head of the silent service and cannot advertise my wares." – Allen Dulles, 1957.

The American Society of Newspaper Editors was flattered that theirs was the forum chosen by Mr. Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence and concurrently director of the Central Intelligence Agency, for his first public speech in 10 years. "The quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States in 1971," he told the editors in a self-serving assessment, "is better than it has ever been before." It would have been interesting had Mr. Helms attempted a correlation between value and volume. Benjamin Welles in *The New York Times Sunday Magazine* (April 18, 1971) breaks down the daily mountain of intelligence information as "50 percent from overt sources such as periodicals, 35 percent from electronics [satellites and radio], and the remaining 15 percent from agents." How important is the 15 percent?

Mr. Helms noted the "growing criticism" of CIA, but he avoided any discussion of its cause. The "intelligence" function of the agency is not what has provoked all the controversy. Criticism has centered not on "spying," but on CIA's political action abroad – the suborning of political leaders, labor union officials, scholars, students, journalists and anyone else who can be bought. CIA has been criticized for straying from information gathering onto the path of manipulation of foundations and such organizations as the National Student Association or Radio Free Europe or the AFL-CIO. Through liaison with foreign police and security services, the CIA tries to keep track of foreign "subversives," frequently defined as those who want to depose the government in power. Each report it manages to secure from its clandestine sources has a price in terms of closer alliance with one reactionary regime after another – as in Greece and numerous countries in Asia and Latin America. The complicity is no secret to the host government, or to the Communists, only to the American taxpayer.

Mr. Helms' point that "CIA is not and cannot be its own master" is the most difficult to accept, even from the honorable man that Mr. Helms unquestionably is. To be sure, there is a review system, but it is more shadow than substance. The President's foreign intelligence advisory board, which is supposed to analyze a $4 billion Intelligence program, is characterized by inattention, fatigue and a charming lack of expertise. There is only the most cursory inspection and oversight of CIA by "elements of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees," which from time to time raise their hands in benediction over any Intelligence presentation. The average congressional "watchdog" is long in the tooth, and prefers not to receive [illegible] confessing in advance lack of training in sound security practices. Such small ad hoc bodies cannot possibly cope with the multi-agencies, their billions of dollars, and their hundreds of thousands of people; in sum, the "Intelligence community." The core question, as with the FBI, is an old one: who guards the guardians?

[redacted]

STATINTL

LOS ANGELES TIMES

CIA Chief Reveals Soviet Spy Help in Cuba Missile Crisis

BY CHALMERS M. ROBERTS
Exclusive to The Times from the Washington Post

WASHINGTON—In his first public speech as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms said Wednesday that "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians" helped the United States identify Soviet weapons in Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis.

He mentioned no names, but the reference appeared clearly to be to Col. Oleg Penkovsky, the Soviet intelligence officer who brought much information out during visits to London in the 16 months before the missile crisis. Penkovsky was arrested that October and was subsequently executed for treason.

"The Penkovsky Papers," published as a book in 1965, were widely believed to be based on CIA interrogations, and the claim was made in the introduction that Penkovsky's information was invaluable during the crisis in evaluating the threat from Russian missiles.

However, not until Helms' speech Wednesday at a luncheon of the American Society of Newspaper Editors had an American official in a position to know come so close to crediting Penkovsky openly.

Helms detailed the kind of work the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies did at the time, trying to separate fact from fiction about what Russian Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev was doing in Cuba.

Helms then included this paragraph: "Our intelligence files in Washington, however—thanks to U-2 photography of the Soviet Union and to a number of well-placed and courageous Russians who helped us—included a wealth of information on Soviet missile systems. We had descriptions or photographs of the missiles, their transporters and other associated equipment, and characteristic sites in the Soviet Union."

This enabled specialists, with the help of pictures taken over Cuba, Helms said, to "tell President Kennedy the exact scope of the threat" in determining whether the Soviet missiles were capable of striking at the United States if Mr. Kennedy gave the Russians an ultimatum for their removal.

With that secret data, Helms said, "we were able to inform the President precisely how long it would take (the Russians) to make the missile sites in Cuba operational."

Helms said knowledge of Russian weaponry developed by the CIA, plus its understanding "of Soviet knowledge of our progress," helps the government decide how much money to invest in new weapons.

"If good intelligence can narrow down the choices," he said, "it can save the U.S. taxpayers many times its cost."

Much of Helms' speech was a defense of the CIA against charges that it is an "invisible government." He denied reports that the CIA is "somehow involved in the world drug traffic." Without mentioning recent charges against the FBI, Helms said, "We do not target on American citizens."

The closest Helms came to discussing the CIA's role in current policy issues was his reference to the present strategic arms limitation talks. He said it would be "unthinkable" to conclude a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union "without the means for monitoring compliance."

He did not discuss the CIA's role in the observation satellite program or in electronic eavesdropping used for that purpose only. He did say that the United States can safely undertake such an agreement "only if it has adequate intelligence assets to assure itself that the Soviets are living up to their part."

Helms also said that the CIA wants to talk to private citizens who may have acquired useful information abroad, but that if such a person "does not want to talk to us, we go away quietly."

Referring to student protests against the CIA, Helms said, "If some student groups object to our recruiting on campus, we fall back to the nearest federal office building."

Helms said it was "for Congress to decide" how the CIA is to be supervised but that "elements" of the Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services committees "are told more about our operations than is known to most of the personnel in our highly compartmentalized agency."

15 APR 1971

Excerpts From Speech by Helms to Society of Newspaper Editors

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 14—*Following are excerpts from an address by Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, before the American Society of Newspaper Editors:*

I welcome this opportunity to speak to you today about the place of an intelligence service in a democratic government.

In doing so, I recognize that there is a paradox which I hope can be dispelled:

On the one hand, I can assure you that the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States Government in 1971 is better than it has ever been before.

On the other hand, at a time when it seems to me to be self-evident that our Government must be kept fully informed on foreign developments, there is a persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency.

I am referring to the assertions that the Central Intelligence Agency is an "invisible government," a law unto itself, engaged in provocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society and subject to no controls.

This is an outgrowth, I suppose, of an inherent American distaste for the peacetime gathering of intelligence. Our mission, in the eyes of many thoughtful Americans, may appear to be in conflict with some of the traditions and ideals of our free society.

May I emphasize at this point that the statute [National Security Act of 1947] specifically forbids the Central Intelligence Agency to have any police, subpoena or law-enforcement powers, or any domestic security functions. I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any such powers and functions; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens.

In matters directly affecting the security of the United States, the President and his National Security Council want what we call "national" intelligence—evaluations which reflect the considered and agreed judgment of all of the intelligence components of the United States Government. The production and dissemination of this national intelligence is the responsibility and the primary function of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We not only have no stake in policy debates, but we can not and must not take sides. The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts—the agreed facts—and the whole known range of facts—relevant to the problem under consideration. Our role extends to the estimate function—the projection of likely developments from the facts—but not to advocacy.

Ironically, our efforts to obtain foreign intelligence in this country have generated some of the more virulent criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency.

It is a fact that we have, as I said, no domestic security role, but if there is a chance that a private American citizen traveling abroad has acquired foreign information that can be useful to the American policy-maker, we are certainly going to try to interview him.

If there is a competent young graduate student who is interested in working for the United States Government, we may well try to hire him.

The trouble is that to those who insist on seeing us as a pernicious and pervasive secret government, our words "interview" and "hire" translate into suborn, subvert and seduce, or something worse.

We use no compulsion. If a possible source of information does not want to talk to us, we go away quietly. If some student groups object to our recruiting on campus, we fall back to the nearest Federal office building.

Similarily, we welcome the opportunity to place research contracts with the universities, but again, these are strictly voluntary.

And so I come to the fundamental question of reconciling the security needs of an intelligence service with the basic principles of our democratic society. At the root of the problem is secrecy, because it is axiomatic that an intelligence service—whatever type of government it serves—must wrap itself in as much secrecy as possible in order to operate effectively.

If we disclose how much we know, the opposition is handed on a platter highly damaging indications of how and where we obtained the information, in what way his security is vulnerable, and who may have helped us. He can seal off the breach in his defenses, roll up the agents, and shut off the flow of information.

I cannot give you an easy answer to the objections raised by those who consider intelligence work incompatible with democratic principles. The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service. I can assure you that we are, but I am precluded from demonstrating it to the public.

I can assure you that what I have asked you to take on faith, the elected officials of the United States Government watch over extensively, intensively and continuously.

Starting with the executive branch, the Central Intelligence Agency operates under the constant supervision and direction of the National Security Council. No significant foreign program of any kind is undertaken without the prior approval of an N.S.C. subcommittee which includes representatives of the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

In addition, we report periodically and in detail on the whole range of foreign intelligence activities to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a group of men who have distinguished themselves in Government, industry, education and the professions.

Our budget is gone over line for line by the Office of Management and Budget and by the appropriate committees of the Congress as well.

There are elements of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees in both the Senate and the House which—like the President's board—are told more about our activities and our operations than is known to most of the personnel in our highly compartmented agency. But how, in the end, we are [illegible] Congress itself to decide.

In short, the Central Intelligence Agency is not and cannot be its own master.

The same objectivity which makes us useful to our Government and our country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it. We may chafe under the criticism we do not answer, but we understand as well as anyone the difficulties and the contradictions of conducting foreign intelligence operations on behalf of a free society.

We are, after all, a part of this democracy, and we believe in it. We would not want to see our work distort its values and its principles. We propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa.

We believe, and I say this solemnly, that our work is necessary to permit this country to grow on in a fearsome world and to find its way into a better and more peaceful one.

[redacted]

Rep. Mahon Fails On 'Open' Hearing

Last week Chairman George H. Mahon (D-Tex.) promised that this year his House Appropriations Committee, which has always worked behind closed doors, would hold a number of open hearings—such as those where Cabinet members testify.

Yesterday, at the committee's first hearing of the year, Secretary Elliot L. Richardson testified on the Health, Education and Welfare budget—in closed session. The committee said Mahon hadn't been able to complete arrangements for borrowing hearing rooms large enough to accommodate the public.

NATIONAL JOURNAL
6 FEBRUARY 1971

STATINTL

Ellender and Mahon: Two Skeptical Views

The Nixon budget has failed to win support from the chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees—men who are destined to play vital roles in shaping the budget's congressional fate.

"I don't think it's a sound document," Sen. Allen J. Ellender, D-La., the new chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, told *National Journal* Feb. 3.

"The embracing of a deficit budget...is a potentially dangerous approach to our fiscal situation," Rep. George Mahon, D-Tex., the House chairman, told his colleagues Jan. 29.

Senate

In an interview, Ellender predicted that the fiscal 1972 budget, if enacted without change, would yield a $35-billion deficit instead of the $23.2-billion deficit projected by the Administration. (Ellender referred to the traditional "administrative budget," which deals with federal funds and excludes portions of the "unified budget," such as trust funds for social security payments. The unified budget was first adopted in fiscal 1969.)

"I can well remember when Congress thought President Roosevelt was out of his mind to propose a budget of $9 billion to take us out of the depression," said Ellender, who entered the Senate in 1937.

Reform proposals: Ellender became chairman of the 24-member Appropriations Committee last month after the death of Sen. Richard B. Russell, D-Ga. (1933-71). He said he has these plans for the committee:

- Abolish the appropriations subcommittee on deficiencies and supplementals. Administration requests for additional funds not covered in the budget would go before the subcommittee that normally deals with that budgetary sector. "In the past, supplementals have been used to get around earlier turn-downs," Ellender said.
- Push forward deadlines for completing appropriations hearings, no longer waiting for the House to finish its work before proceeding. "It's too late to do this in May or June, as has been done in the past," he said.
- Coordinate the schedules of the remaining 14 subcommittees so that no two panels meet simultaneously. In this way, Ellender said, Senators would no longer have to choose which of several simultaneous sessions to attend.
- Delve more deeply into the budget, rather than act as a "court of appeals" on items previously slashed by the House.

Focal points: Ellender said projected outlays of $76,000,000,000 for defense and $3,152,350,000 for space would receive "special scrutiny."

As chairman of the defense appropriations subcommittee, Ellender expects to have a different role from his predecessor, Russell, who was generally sympathetic with the military's spending requests.

"We are preparing for a conflict that in my book will never happen," Ellender said. "Our prime goal should be to get better relations with the Russians, and the best way to work for peace is not to maintain our forces all over the Mediterranean, Europe and the Pacific."

Revenue sharing: Ellender also criticized the Nixon revenue-sharing concept: "I won't vote for any program where we say to a municipality, 'Here's your share, use it as you will.' This is wrong. I want us to administer these programs."

A desirable alternative, Ellender said, would be to give governmental units freedom to select those grant-in-aid programs that "they feel would do them the most good," up to a specified limit.

"Let's leave some discretion in the hands of those who can use the money," Ellender said. "Now, on many programs, puny bureaucrats go out and say, 'Come on, here's what you can get.' I think that's awful."

House

Chairman Mahon shared Ellender's doubts in his House remarks and in a subsequent interview with *National Journal*.

Inflationary aspects: Mahon said: "In prior years we have looked with a jaundiced eye on deficit spending; but now it is proposed that we suddenly and affectionately embrace deficits of tremendous proportions with the assurance that this is just what the country needs. Are we making a virtue of spending money which is neither in hand nor in sight? I am afraid that is what this budget may tend to do."

While Mahon took note of the President's fiscal problems, he nonetheless questioned whether "the garment in which this budget is now dressed (will) be the same garment when the year is over."

Revenue sharing: Mahon also spurned the revenue-sharing proposals.

"Is it logical and is it wise," he said, "for one legislative body to raise the money and then turn it over to another legislative body, the states or the cities, for their expenditure?...Congress will look a long time at this proposal. I think it should."

Revised procedure: In the interview, Mahon said he intended to hold hearings, probably in late February, to review the entire budget as well as "the underlying basis" of the Nixon fiscal program.

The Administration witnesses, Mahon said, will be Treasury Secretary-designate John B. Connally; George P. Shultz, director of the Office of Management and Budget; and Paul W. McCracken, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

The House budgetary review hearings, previously held behind closed doors, will be in open session in keeping with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat 1140). The new law requires the Treasury Secretary and the OMB director to testify. McCracken has agreed to join them at Mahon's request.

The 54-member House Appropriations Committee will operate through its 13 subcommittees after the initial hearings end. Said Mahon: "We tend to be more an aggregation of autonomous subcommittees than a cohesive Appropriations Committee."

NEW YORK TIMES
FEB 4 1957

New Senate Patriarch

Allen Joseph Ellender

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3—The president pro tempore of the Senate is, by definition, the patriarch of the chamber, its leading man in seniority and, usually, in age. As a consequence, he is also likely to be the quintessential old-line Senator: wise, calm, politic and unshakably conservative. Allen Joseph Ellender of Louisiana is some of these things, but others of them he most certainly is not. At 80, he is the oldest of the Senate's senior citizens; last month he completed 34 years in the Senate, four more than the total of his nearest competitor.

Man In the News

But Senator Ellender is one of the least sedentary men in Washington. Trim and energetic, his 5-foot-4 frame almost bounces in Senate debate. From time to time, he is also inclined to be a good deal less diplomatic than might be expected of a politician of his experience.

The man he succeeded as leader of the Southern bloc and president pro tem, Richard B. Russell of Georgia, took the classic Establishment position on national defense: lots of it at the Pentagon's cost figures, with firm and extensive military commitments abroad. Mr. Ellender is not so sure on either score.

Neither Smokes Nor Drinks

For a product of the free-swinging political organization of the late Huey P. Long—he drafted the principal defense document when an abortive attempt was made to impeach the Louisiana Governor—Senator Ellender currently leads a notably ascetic social life.

Two years ago, by his own account, he told an inquiring Russian that his demonstrable energy and enthusiasm were "a result of the fact that I neither smoked nor drank and refrained from chasing women."

The last stricture did not prevent him, however, from blowing a kiss to a pretty reporter in the Senate press gallery when the farm bill passed last year, the sort of gesture that has led some observers to describe him as "courtly."

The earlier history of that farm bill also demonstrated that Senator Ellender can be something other than courtly upon occasion. When he was displeased with the treatment given cotton farmers in the final compromise, he held the bill up for several weeks.

Senator Ellender has rarely been one to sit back and sulk when crossed. On a visit to Moscow in 1955, when the American Embassy declined to make Soviet appointments for him or to let him use its phone, he stamped out to a public booth, called the Foreign Ministry and landed a two-hour interview with Anastas I. Mikoyan, then first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.

During a tour of Africa in 1932, he declared that "the average African is incapable of leadership except through the assistance of Europeans" and was promptly blacklisted by three African countries.

Six months later, back in the United States, he compounded the resulting irritation by charging that Negroes generally "haven't yet shown themselves capable of effective self-government" and that those in this country "are attempting to use their color to camouflage their lack of capability."

Mr. Ellender was born on Sept. 24, 1890, in Montegut, La., a hamlet deep in the bayou country. He went to college at St. Aloysius in New Orleans and on to law school at Tulane. After apprenticeship as a district attorney, he went to the State House of Representatives in 1924.

Known as a Cool

Favored by Governor Long, he rose rapidly to floor leader in 1928 and Speaker in 1932. He was one of the last men to whom Senator Long spoke before his assassination in September, 1935; the following year he succeeded him in the Senate.

Mr. Ellender married Helen C. Donnelly in 1917. They had a son, Dr. Allen J. Ellender Jr., who is now a surgeon in Houma, La., and seven grandchildren. Mrs. Ellender died in 1949.



The New York Times

Shuns smoking, drinking and "chasing women."

In Washington, Mr. Ellender has consistently argued, as have few of his colleagues, for a reduction in Congressional staff expense, particularly for investigations. He has set an example by maintaining one of the smallest Senate staffs on the Hill and paying his aides less than the allowed maximum.

Senator Ellender's best-known extra-Congressional activity is cooking. He regularly brews up a batch of creole gumbo or shrimp jambalaya in his Capitol office and invites in a group of colleagues or a press delegation.

Ambition did not end for Mr. Ellender with his elevation to the Senate's most august title. He has already announced his intention to run for the Senate again in 1972 and 1978 to break the all-time service record of 42 years 9 months set by Carl Hayden of Arizona in 1926-68.

STATINTL

The New Chairman Of Appropriations

By Stephen S. Rosenfeld

IT IS beginning to dawn on Washington that the congressional seniority system has elevated to the key post of chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee a man, Allen J. Ellender, who holds very different views on foreign policy and military spending from previous occupants of that chair. And while the actual effects of the change remain to be worked out, the possibilities are downright intriguing—though for the administration, disquieting might be a better word.

Ellender replaces, of course, Richard B. Russell, a patron of the Pentagon who died last month. The Louisiana Democrat, bouncy at 80, had sat on Appropriations, and on its defense subcommittee, for years. In that time, he toured the world almost annually and issued long reports which provoked a certain amount of irritation or mirth in various quarters but which, somewhat unfairly, failed to establish him as a serious student of international affairs. Meanwhile, he chaired the Argiculture Committee.

Now, Ellender has given up the Agriculture helm to take over Appropriations, and to run its defense subcommittee. He is no longer distracted by other responsibilities and no longer restrained by his personal and Southern and senatorial regard for Richard Russell. He is finally in a position to apply his world view, previously neglected or dismissed as an expression of one man's eccentricity, directly to the defense posture of the United States.

HIS VIEW is, in brief, that the United States is overextended abroad, that it spends too much on strategic weapons and conventional forces alike, that this spending pattern has been sustained by an arbitrary and self-fulfilling image of the Soviet Union as a deadly threat, and that major revisions in foreign policy and military spending must be made to save the nation from insolvency and other disasters.

Already last year, while Russell was in physical decline, Ellender began moving to the fore in Appropriations. Sen. Proxmire, widely known as a critic of defense spending, found himself congratulaitng Ellender publicly after the energetic Louisianan presided over a $2.3 billion reduction in the administration's defense request.

The senator himself is quite aware of the sensitivity of his new role as Appropriations chairman. He shies away from being labelled as a dove. "I bow to no one in the Senate," he said in an interview this week, "in my determination to keep this country strong."

But he asserted, with characteristic relish, that the national security can be amply served "with less dollars," and he said "there's no doubt about it," there's going to be a confrontation between him and the ad-

FROM THE interview and his other public statements, four likely arenas can be identified:

1. *NATO.* Ellender is convinced that keeping five and a half divisions in Europe virtually invites our European allies to free-load and skimp on their own NATO contributions. Their recent five-year pledge of an extra $1 billion he sees as "measly ante." If American troops are not to be significantly reduced, he says, the allies ought to pay "more than half" of the $14 billion cost of their current upkeep.

2. *Strategic weapons.* New weapons, like NATO, merely increase Soviet fears and lead to a mutual quickening of the arms race. Ellender worries that decisions to build new weapons are made "85 per cent" on the basis of "what is generally referred to as intelligence." But the intelligence may be wrong and if it is, it results in acquisition of unnecessary arms.

3. *Soviet-American negotiations.* The SALT talks to limit strategic arms cannot succeed if the administration hews to its policy of building new weapons. (Ellender voted for the Hart-Cooper ABM-limiting amendment last year; Russell voted against it.) The concept of "negotiating from strength" is fallacious: "What concerns me is that we—the United States and Russia—continue with the development and deployment of these expensive weapons systems, notwithstanding the fact that the people of this country and the people of Russia do not want to destroy one another." Indeed, the notion that a country's foreign policy ought to express the feelings of its common citizens is one of the principal byproducts of Ellender's five trips through Russia, where the good will of the people he encountered deeply moved him.

4 *Strict accounting:* "We are going to make the administration justify every penny." Ellender's investigative tenacity is something of a legend, albeit a notorious one in some parts of the federal bureaucracy. A sample of the kind of scrutiny the defense budget may now expect was contained in his interrogation of the Air Force Chief of Staff last year:

Ellender: "General (Ryan), you seem confident that the low-flying B-1 will be able to escape the air defenses of our potential enemy, the Russians. I seem to remember that when the Air Force was advocating the B-70, the argument was made that its high-altitude capability would permit it to escape those defenses, but this did not prove to be the case so we cancelled the B-70. My question is this: Don't you think the Russians will now concentrate on improving their air defense in order to cope with the low-level capabilities of the FB-111's and the proposed B-1?"

Ryan: "There is always a reaction between the offense and defense."

Ellender: "That is right."

Ellender, by the way, is itching to have the Joint Chiefs attend a special showing of a film he shot on his latest trip to Russia. He is sure the chiefs could learn a lot from it. Whether they will, he is not so sure, but he come have a look.

NEW YORK TIMES 24 JAN 1970

[redacted]

Case Would Bar C.I.A. Aid For Radio Free Europe

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 23—Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, charged today that the Central Intelligence Agency had spent several hundred million dollars over the last 20 years to keep Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty functioning.

Mr. Case, a member of the Appropriations and Foreign Relations Committees, said that he would introduce legislation Monday to bring Government spending on the two stations under the authorization and appropriations process of Congress. Representative Ogden R. Reid, Republican of Westchester, said today that he would introduce similar legislation in the House.

Radio Free Europe, founded in 1950, and Radio Liberty, formed a year later, both have powerful transmitters in Munich, West Germany, staffed by several thousand American technicians and refugees from Eastern Europe.

Radio Liberty broadcasts only into the Soviet Union, Radio Free Europe to other Eastern European countries except Yugoslavia.

Both organizations have offices in New York and purport to be privately endowed with funds coming exclusively from foundations, corporations and the public. Both, however, are extremely reticent about the details of their financing.

Senator Case noted in a statement that both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty "claim to be nongovernmental organizations sponsored by private contributions." However, he went on, "available sources indicate direct C.I.A. subsidies pay nearly all their costs."

The Senator said that the Central Intelligence Agency provided the stations with $30-million in the last fiscal year without formal Congressional approval.

Disclosures Restricted

Under the Central Intelligence Agency's operating rules, its activities—such as covert funding — are approved by the National Security Council. However, disclosure to Congress is limited to a handful of senior legislators on watchdog committees of each house.

The Central Intelligence Agency and Radio Free Europe both declined to comment today on Senator Case's statement. Efforts to elicit comment from Radio Liberty were unavailing.

Covert C.I.A. funding of the two stations has, however, been an open secret for years, although the C.I.A., in accordance with standing policy, and the two stations themselves have consistently refused to discuss either their operations or their funding.

Citing returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service in the 1969 fiscal year, Mr. Case said that the stations' combined operating costs that year totaled $33,997,336. Of this, he said, Radio Free Europe spent $21,109,935 and Radio Liberty $12,887,401.

Funds Sought by Advertisement

"The bulk of Radio Free Europe's and Radio Liberty's budgets, or more than $30-million annually, comes from direct C.I.A. subsidies," Mr. Case charged. "Congress has never participated in authorization of appropriations of funds to R.F.E. or R.L., although hundrdes of millions of dollars in Government funds have been spent durirng the last 20 years."

Mr. Case pointed out that Radio Frree Europe conducted a yearly campaign for public contributions under the auspices of the Advertising Council. Between $12-million and $20-million in free media space is donated annually to this campaign, he said, but the rreturn from the public is "apparently less than $100,000."

Furthermore, he said, both stations attempt to raise money from corporations and foundations but contributions from these sources reportedly pay only a small part of the stations' total budgets.

Senator Case said that his proposed legislation would seek to amend the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 to authorize funds for both stations in the fiscal year beginning next July 1. His proposal would call for an initial sum of $30-million, but he said that the sum would be subject to change.

Bar on Other Funds

At the same time, Mr. Case said, his proposal would provide that "no other" United States Government funds could be made available to either station except under the provisions of the act. He also said that he would ask that Administration officials concerned with overseas information policies be called to testify in order to determine the amount needed for the stations' operations.

"I can understand why covert funds might have been used for a year or two in an emergency situation when extreme secrecy was necessary and when no other Government funds were available," Mr. Case said.

But, he went on, the justification for covert funding has lessened over the years as international tension has eased, as the secrecy surrounding the stations has 'melted away," and as more open means of funding could be developed.

"In other words," he said, "the extraordinary circumstances that might have been thought to justify circumvention of constitutional processes and Congressional approval no longer exist."

John Created XXX

Mr. Case pointed out that in 1967, after there had been public disclosure that the C.I.A. had been secretly funding the National Student Association, President Johnson created a committee that was headed by Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, the Under Secretary of State, and that included Richard Helms, head of the C.I.A., and John W. Gardner, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

He further noted that on March 29, 1967, Mr. Johnson publicly accepted the committee's recommendation that "no Federal agency shall provide covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or voluntary organizations" and that "no programs currently would justify any exceptions to this policy."

People familiar with the operations of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty noted that both had been started at the peak of the Cold War and had just "gone rolling on" ever since. The Katzenbach committee, some sources said, had cut off covert funding from virtually all other recipients.

"They solved all the tough ones," one source said, "but they were under such pressure from Johnson to get their report out and get the heat from Congress and the public cut off that they didn't solve the funding of the stations. They turned it over to another committee."

The second committee, whose members these sources declined to identify, worked over a year and then turned in secret recommendations to Mr. Johnson. However, Mr. Johnson pigeonholed the recommendations and finally left the problem for the incoming Nixon Administration to solve, the sources said.

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